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This dissertation is a study of how estimation and optimal policy can be incomplete when
important labor market and hedonic variables are unobservable. Methods for inferring the
relevant unobserved values and correcting public policy are presented in the dissertation. The
first chapter is an examination of labor match quality and match amenities, neither of which
are directly observable. The second chapter is an analysis of dynamics in subjective well-
being data, with methods developed to facilitate comparison of happiness-relevant events
that are otherwise not comparable. The final chapter is a more detailed exploration of the
empirical and policy consequences of omitting labor market match amenities.
In the first chapter, “Match Quality with Unpriced Amenities”, I examine the role that
variation in job match quality plays in determining workers’ search decisions. Typically,
monetary productivity is assumed to be the sole determinant of the quality of a worker-
firm match. I develop a structural search model that allows job match quality to depend
additionally on unpriced job amenities, permitting match quality estimation that is robust
to both unobserved amenities and selection. I estimate the model with tenure data using
the simulated generalized method of moments. The chapter demonstrates that previous
estimates relying principally on wage data, rather than duration data, are incomplete in
certain respects. The standard deviation of job amenities is found to be nearly as large as that
of monetary productivity in data from the 1979 NLSY. I then use the model to investigate the
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welfare consequences of wage taxation and unemployment insurance. Traditional estimates
of deadweight loss from wage taxation are increasingly overstated as job amenity dispersion
rises.
In “Accounting for Adaptation in the Economics of Happiness”, coauthored with Miles
Kimball and Dan Silverman, we attempt to take the dynamics of happiness seriously. Hap-
piness economics is one potentially useful way to approach unpriced and non-market goods,
since subjective well-being responds to such goods in a predictable way. Previous work gen-
erally estimates fixed, time-invariant effects on happiness, which can lead to various biases.
Our contribution is an econometric approach, based on nonlinear least squares estimation,
that is robust to individual fixed effects, imprecisely-dated data, bias from imperfect recall,
and permanent event consequences. Most importantly, though, it incorporates differences in
the time path of happiness after events, permitting comparison of events with dissimilar time
paths and mean reversion. Our method is used to analyze a variety of events in the Health
and Retirement Study panel. Many of the variables studied have substantial consequences
for subjective well-being - consequences that differ greatly in their time profiles.
In the final chapter, “Taxation, Match Quality and Social Welfare”, Brendan Epstein
and I extend the analysis conducted in the first chapter. The costly, endogenous supply
of job amenities by firms has a number of interesting implications for labor markets and
public policy. In particular, results from the present paper reinforce a conclusion from the
first chapter: the public finance literature concerning deadweight loss estimation should take
amenities into account. Previous work has made the case for utilizing data on taxable in-
come elasticities, rather than labor supply elasticities, for the purpose of calculating social
welfare consequences of taxation. We show that it is necessary to estimate the heterogeneity
and parameters of amenity supply in order to correctly infer deadweight loss from taxation.
Deadweight loss is generally overestimated in research that omits explicit consideration of
amenities, and this overestimation is proportional to the quantitative significance of het-
erogeneity in amenities across job matches. The endogenous supply of amenities, rather
2
than exogenous endowment, is shown to exacerbate this overestimation. Examination of a
friction-less economy reveals that this result is not necessarily an artifact of search. Finally,




Match Quality with Unpriced Amenities
2.1 Introduction
A chief function of labor markets is to match firms and workers in such a way as to
exploit gains from specialization and differences in ability and preferences. Some of what
matters for the optimal allocation of labor is related to monetary productivity. However,
many relevant variables are unobservable and unpriced. The monetary and non-monetary
total surplus generated by a particular worker-firm pairing (“match quality”) will vary across
possible matches, creating a ranking of potential matches by their surplus. The heterogeneity
of match quality is strongly suggested by various data, most notably wage dispersion (e.g.,
Mortensen, 2003, Woodcock, 2007, Bowlus, 1995). The existence of this heterogeneity has
important implications for worker search behavior and its associated social welfare conse-
quences. If labor market comparative advantage is substantial, there is tremendous surplus
generated by the optimal coordination of workers and jobs. If comparative advantage is
minimal, there is little need to be concerned with policies that affect match quality.
Some of match quality is entirely monetary: a worker may possess an unusual talent
for a particular job task, for instance, and this will be reflected in increased output and
wages. Another important sort of worker-firm interaction, however, consists of non-monetary
factors. For example, some jobs entail a considerable amount of psychologically costly work.
Individual workers will vary in their tolerance for this, and will possess different rankings of
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jobs by level of unpleasantness. Many jobs even include some pleasant aspects, which will
be more or less valuable to different individuals. These non-monetary considerations are
difficult to observe and cannot typically be inferred from wage variation.
To see why total match quality variation is not obtainable from wage data in the presence
of an unpriced amenity, consider the following example. Imagine an employed worker who
chooses to accept a new job at a higher overall match quality, where the increase in quality
is equally divided between higher productivity and higher amenity. For simplicity, let the
worker’s compensation (wage plus amenity) be half the surplus to the match. Though the
worker’s full compensation will be higher after the switch, her observed wage (compensation
minus amenity) will be identical before and after the switch, because the amenity improve-
ment balances out the productivity improvement. No wage dispersion is generated by this
job transition, and yet match quality variation exists by stipulation.
Both on- and off-the-job search will allow workers to move into higher match quality jobs,
which generates an accepted match quality distribution distinct from the match quality “of-
fer” distribution. This paper develops a model that can identify both of these distributions.
In contrast, direct wage regressions can recover only the accepted distribution, cannot distin-
guish productivity and amenity, and cannot recover total match quality without additional
assumptions on the covariance of amenity and productivity. Attempts to infer match quality
dispersion from wage residuals are also weakened by measurement error in wages, which is
substantial and difficult to deal with in the familiar panel datasets.
Structural estimation using tenure data offers a credible solution to these problems. The
model embeds match quality and amenity heterogeneity in a standard labor search context.
The tenure distribution moves in response to changes in the dispersion of match quality,
reflecting varying rates of separations and on-the-job transitions at different levels of match
quality. This is the most important source of identification. Monetary and non-monetary
match quality component distributions are separated by examining the correlation of tenure
and wages. A higher correlation indicates a larger role for monetary match quality, since
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high quality matches (high tenure) are associated with high wages. A lower correlation
indicates the opposite, with high quality matches exhibiting a weak or negative relationship
with wages due to the large fraction of unobserved amenities in total worker compensation.
The estimated match quality and other parameters have important consequences for
optimal wage tax policy and optimal unemployment insurance policy, among other things.
Wage taxes generate a significant and quantifiable distortion by changing the endogenous
productivity-amenity composition of match quality. Optimal unemployment benefits are
calculated and shown to be increasing in the variance of match quality.
Section 2.2 is an outline of some simpler, closed-form models of labor supply that build
intuition for the baseline empirical model. Restrictions are imposed, relative to the baseline
model presented later, that allow for an analytic characterization of unemployment and wages
in terms of the match quality distribution. Calculation of the deadweight loss from a wage
tax requires knowledge of the “accepted” match quality distribution (i.e., the distribution
observed in employed workers), which is an endogenous object and is solved for in terms of
parameters of the model.
In Section 2.2.1, I discuss the limitations of some previous wage-based approaches and
detail the considerations that motivate this paper’s innovations: unpriced amenities and the
unobserved match quality offer distribution (as contrasted with the accepted distribution).
This section argues that accounting for these factors requires a different approach than
previously employed. Job amenities are an important part of compensation that will bias
approaches primarily reliant on wage data. Ignoring the offered/accepted distinction will
lead to underestimates of offered match quality, which can bias policy implications.
Section 2.3 contains the baseline model. The economy consists of ex ante identical work-
ers and firms with wages endogenously set each period by Nash bargaining. In each period,
workers may receive a job offer, occurring with a probability that is conditional on employ-
ment status. Importantly, each worker-firm meeting is characterized by a match quality
composed of both a monetary productivity term and a non-monetary job amenity. Each
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component has an exogenous normal distribution with a variance that will be separately
identified.
Section 2.4 is a description of the data, which comes from the 1979 National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth, including tenure, wage, and demographic information. Section 2.4.1
explains the identification strategy. Most importantly, identification of the match quality
parameters is from the shape of the tenure distribution. Section 2.4.2 is a description of the
estimation procedure. Section 2.5 contains the results of the baseline model. Amenities are
found to be about four-fifths as large as monetary productivity, in terms of standard devi-
ation, and a standard deviation of overall match quality is approximately $12.19 per hour,
equivalent to nearly 40 percent of average flow output. Job switching costs are estimated to
be about four months of the average observed wage.
In Section 2.5.1 and Section 2.5.2, I conduct applications of the model, including an
analysis of the distortion from preferential tax treatment of unpriced amenities and the
contribution of match quality dispersion to an understanding of optimal unemployment in-
surance. Wage taxation encourages workers to find work in higher-amenity, lower-wage (and
lower monetary productivity) matches, which leads to lower social welfare. The distortion
quickly becomes large at plausible tax rates, and I show that match quality heterogeneity
makes it impossible to infer the deadweight loss from the taxable income elasticity alone.
As match quality variance rises, the optimal UI benefit also rises, reflecting the increased
social benefit to job search (imperfectly internalized by the worker). I find that the optimal
UI benefit as a fraction of average flow surplus rises by about 14 percentage points when
the standard deviation of match quality is doubled. The extent of match quality variation
should be an input to a more general theory of optimal UI.
Section 2.5.3 is a comparison of the model’s results with results from an entirely wage-
based approach. Section 2.6 is an examination of the relevant literature. Section 2.7 discusses
future research. First, estimates of match quality variation are a necessary input to an un-
derstanding of cyclical productivity dynamics. Significant work has gone into characterizing
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the behavior of average and marginal labor productivity over the cycle, as they have im-
portant implications for the welfare cost of recessions. Second, a more general treatment of
social welfare and match quality remains to be conducted. I explore this in a separate paper
with a coauthor.
2.2 Theory
Before proceeding to the structural model used for estimation, I consider a simpler setting
that develops some of the relevant intuition. It retains search frictions, but uses a simpler
wage-setting rule and a few other model restrictions that allow for closed-form expressions.
Consider an economy with a measure of workers and a measure of profit-maximizing
firms. A match between a worker and firm generates surplus m > b, where b is the flow
benefit to unemployment (i.e., the worker’s outside option). m is specific to a particular
match between the worker and a firm, but does not vary over time within the match. New
job offers, with new draws of match quality, are distributed according to a cdf Moffer and
arrive with probability α whether the worker is employed or unemployed. Workers make
take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to firms (note that Section 2.3 will instead assume a Nash
bargain over the match surplus). Assume further that workers transition exogenously into
unemployment with probability s, and that this separation shock either occurs or does not
occur prior to the “new job” shock. Then the worker’s discrete value function will be
W (m) = m+ βsU + β(1− s)(1− α)W (m) + β(1− s)αEm′ [max{W (m′),W (m)}],
where β is the discount factor and U is the unemployment value function, given by
U = b+ βαEm′ [max{W (m′), U}].
Note that the wage is simply m, as firms are competitive in the labor market. I do not
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model the demand side of the labor market in this section. The reservation wage will be mr
such that W (mr) = U . It is easy to see that wr = mr = b. Since the on- and off-the-job
arrival probabilities are equal, workers will always prefer employment to unemployment when
they receive at least the flow benefit to unemployment. In the baseline model presented later,
this will no longer be the case, because differences in arrival probabilities will lead workers
to prefer search from either the employed or unemployed state.
In this simple economy, it is possible to characterize the steady state cumulative distri-
bution function of wages χ (which is just the distribution of actual match quality) and the
unemployment rate. To accomplish this, some steady state identities are required. First,
inflow into employment below or equal to a particular match quality must equal outflow from
below or equal to that match quality. Second, inflow into unemployment will equal outflow
from unemployment. For simplicity, set the lower bound of the Moffer support to be b. This
will cause Moffer and χ to have identical supports, albeit different values throughout the
support. The equations below characterize u and χ(m).
αu(Moffer(m)−Moffer(mr)) (2.1)
= s(1− u)χ(m) + (1− s)α(1− u)χ(m)(1−Moffer(m)) ∀m ∈ χ−1 (2.2)
s(1− u) = αu(1−Moffer(mr)), (2.3)
where u is the fraction of workers who are unemployed. Note that workers always switch to
jobs with higher wages. Moffer is exogenously given, which leaves the function χ and the
scalar u to be endogenously determined. The second equation yields an unemployment rate
u = s
s+α
, recalling that Moffer(mr) = 0 by stipulation. χ is pinned down by u and equation





Now separate match quality m into two components: productivity π and non-monetary
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amenity q. The amenity is randomly endowed and not constructed by a firm. Wages are now
a function of π rather than m. Let the two components of match quality be uncorrelated and
perfectly substitutable in consumption, and let productivity π be taxed at rate τ . Amenities
remain untaxed. After-tax wages are now (1− τ)π, and
W (π, q) = (1−τ)π+q+βsU+β(1−s)(1−α)W (π, q)+β(1−s)αEπ′,q′ [max{W (π′, q′),W (π, q)}].
U is altered similarly. The reservation wage is set such that b = (1− τ)wr + q → wr = b−q1−τ .
Intuitively, the taxation of income will introduce a distortion, with workers choosing jobs
that have relatively high amenity value and low wages. Since utility is linear in match quality,





(1− u)(π + q)ma(π, q)dq dπ,
where ma is the density associated with the cdf Maccepted, the fraction of employed workers
in jobs at or below productivity π and amenity q, and {π, π}, {q, q} are the upper and lower
bounds of π and q, respectively.
First, however, it is necessary to calculate Maccepted and ma. The new equations describing
their behavior are
αu(Moffer(π, q)−Moffer(πR(q), q)) = s(1− u)Maccepted(π, q)
+ (1− s)α(1− u)Maccepted(π, q)(1−Moffer(πr(q′|q, π), q)) ∀π, q ∈M−1accepted
s(1− u) = αu(1−Moffer(πR(q), q)).
I relax the assumption that all wage offers are sufficient to induce movement out of
unemployment, because one of the mechanisms by which higher taxes induce a distortion
is the unemployment they generate. The resulting expressions are thus somewhat messier.
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Unemployment is now u = s
s+α−αMoffer( b−q1−τ ,q)
. The accepted match quality distribution is
Maccepted(π, q) =
αs(Moffer(π, q)−Moffer( b−q1−τ , q))
α(1− s)(α− αMoffer( b−q1−τ , q))(1−Moffer(π +
q−q′
1−τ , q
′)) + s(α− αMoffer( b−q1−τ , q))
.
Given a functional form assumption on Moffer, ma and the size of the distortion can be
calculated. The baseline model presented in Section 2.3 will aim to estimate Moffer in a
more complicated context, permitting the calculation of Maccepted and the DWL.
2.2.1 Comparative Advantage, Job Amenities, and the Offered/Accepted Dis-
tinction
The discussion of comparative advantage in the labor market has been limited in at
least one important way. Abowd et al. (2009) describe the literature that treats correlation
between worker and firm productivity types as fully constituting what is meant by “com-
parative advantage”: “The estimated correlation between worker and firm effects from the
earnings decomposition is close to zero, a finding that is often interpreted as evidence that
there is no sorting by comparative advantage in the labor market.”(Abowd et al., 2009,
abstract) For example, consider the following earnings decomposition by Abowd et al on
matched firm-worker data: log(wit) = xitβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + εit, where wit is the person-year
specific wage, x is a set of demographic and labor market variables, θ is a person-specific fixed
effect and ψ is a firm-specific fixed effect. This earnings decomposition is not dispositive with
respect to labor market comparative advantage, however. Comparative advantage should be
understood to refer to the relative superiority of any conceivable labor market match. The
usual interpretation allows comparative advantage to operate only across worker and firm
type; i.e., workers with low average wages may be more productive when associated with low
productivity firms, but no allowance is made for the possibility that some low-wage workers
may be profitably associated with particular low or high productivity firms but not others.
Put more formally, a finite number of possible worker-firm matches are ordered by their
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productivity, and there is no requirement that matches by workers and firms of a particular
{θ, ψ} combination all have the same productivity.
While interesting and informative about the production function, the worker and firm
fixed effects correlation does not end the discussion of labor market comparative advantage.
However, other wage regression specifications are potentially more informative about match
quality. Consider a regression similar to the decomposition shown above.
log(wit) = xitβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + µi,j + εit,
where the only additional variable is µij, a worker-firm match fixed effect. With no amenities
and for the accepted match quality distribution, the distribution of µij summarizes match
quality heterogeneity.
Interestingly, Woodcock (2007) finds that the data reject the Abowd et al specification
in favor of the same specification but with match effects included. Woodcock (2008) further
develops the econometric model with match effects, discusses the nature of biases in the
various specifications, and applies the match effects model to inter-industry and inter-sex
wage differentials.
The approach taken in this paper is quite different than that of the previously-discussed
literature. In addition to explicitly dealing with idiosyncratic firm-worker match quality,
I account for unpriced job amenities and the necessity of recovering the unobserved offer
distribution of match quality. This section demonstrates the importance of the two concerns
for a proper understanding of the labor market.
In the absence of these issues, this paper would provide an alternative but not obviously
preferable picture of the match quality distribution, relative to a wage-based approach. The
first issue is the distinction between the component of job surplus that accrues directly to
employers (termed “productivity”) and the component that enters directly into the worker’s
utility (“job amenities”). The latter is not directly observable and has traditionally been
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inferred from wage variation in a model that presumes equality of utility across jobs, condi-
tional on observable characteristics of the firm and worker.1 Alternatively, one can assume
that amenities do not exist, and interpret wage dispersion as match quality dispersion. This
approach leads one away from classical labor markets and towards a search framework, since
classical workers would not be allocated to jobs in which match quality is less than ideal.
In a search context, the assumption of equal utility across jobs is unnecessary and unwar-
ranted. Since it is not possible for a worker to instantly examine all offers, we should expect
job offers to vary in quality and workers to often choose employment that would be non-ideal
in a classical market. This is a natural setting for examining match quality and comparative
advantage, though amenities and compensating differentials require more structure or data
to identify (as in the classical “equal utility” setup).
Workers in a search model receive compensation that is a function of job surplus (pro-
ductivity plus amenities). Note that “compensation” here includes the amenity, and so is
distinct from the observed wage. Neither this compensation nor the observed wage is equal
to productivity, as in a classical labor market, but rather is set by a Nash bargain over the
surplus. Without making an assumption about how productivity and the amenity endoge-
nously co-vary, it is impossible to infer total match quality from observed wages. Under any
assumption about the covariance, amenities and productivity are not separable.





q + 2Cov(π, q) by construction, since m = π + q. If productivity and amenities
are orthogonal, the variance of match quality will be higher than that of productivity. One
way to concretize the estimation problem is to imagine a worker switching from a job with
match quality m1 to a job with match quality m2, m2 > m1. Suppose that m2 − m1 is
equally divided between increases in π and q, the monetary and non-monetary components,
and that workers and firms split the surplus in half. The worker’s initial compensation (in
utility) is w1 + q1 =
π1+q1+b
2
, which implies that w1 =
π1−q1+b
2








, since by stipulation π2 − π1 = q2 − q1 and surplus is shared evenly.
The econometrician observes no change in the wage, yet match quality variation has been
generated by a move to a superior match. Information about the true match effect, inclusive
of non-pecuniary characteristics, can fortunately be extracted from the worker’s decision to
stay at or exit from her job.
The second distinction that motivates this paper’s analysis is between the accepted and
offered match quality distributions. The offer distribution, which governs the range of possi-
ble match quality, will generate many proposed matches that are not acceptable to workers
and firms, while the accepted distribution includes only actual, realized matches. Necessar-
ily, wages can only be directly informative about the accepted distribution, which first order
stochastically dominates the offered distribution. This is true with or without on-the-job
search, as long as workers reject at least a fraction of wage offers. With on-the-job search,
it is true regardless. Changes in the accepted distribution are an important part of cycli-
cal dynamics, and the steady state accepted distribution is an object of interest in its own
right. However, the offer distribution is the relevant object for search considerations, and
by implication optimal unemployment insurance and the deadweight loss of wage taxation.
Workers are interested in the set of possible jobs and set their reservation wages accordingly;
the returns to search do not depend on the distribution of already-accepted job offers.
Further, if the offer and accepted match quality distributions are assumed to be identical,
dispersion of the offer distribution will be underestimated. Workers cluster in the right tail
of the distribution, initially because they reject a fraction of all offers, and then over time
as on-the-job search increases the quality of their matches. For both reasons, a fraction of
offered low quality matches do not appear in the accepted distribution, reducing the variance
of the accepted distribution relative to the offer distribution.
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2.3 Model
The model builds on those developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer
(2006). I account for on-the-job search, match quality heterogeneity, endogenous job destruc-
tion stemming from both job-to-job transitions and changes in the idiosyncratic productivity
of a match, and job switching costs. Search frictions are such that workers and firms meet
each other only occasionally. Matches produce a flow surplus that depends on idiosyncratic
(time-varying) productivity x, a time-invariant match-specific monetary productivity π, and
an amenity q that is produced endogenously by firms. Because matching opportunities are
scarce, surplus is generated by successful matches, and wages are set by bargaining over
this surplus. A worker’s values of being unemployed or employed, as well as firms’ value of
employment, are represented as Bellman equations. Since the resulting functions are both
monotonic and discounted, these equations are contraction mappings.2
Search models have the virtue of rationalizing many stylized labor market facts, like
involuntary unemployment and the behavior of gross job flows. The canonical versions
are carefully constructed so as to permit analytical solutions and clear intuition, but the
particular assumptions required will in some cases render the model less satisfactory both as
a realistic portrayal of a given labor market and as a device for explaining some features of
the data. In this paper, I forego the benefits of a closed-form model solution so as to more
effectively deal with the problem of match quality heterogeneity.
The model is not solvable analytically, so I solve it numerically and simulate it in discrete-
time, calibrated to a monthly frequency. The timing of the model is as follows. A period
begins with any particular worker being either unemployed or employed. If employed, a
worker-firm match is characterized by both a constant match productivity π and a constant
amenity production parameter α.3 Then, a time-varying idiosyncratic productivity shock x
is drawn; this occurs every period. Employed individuals receive a wage and unemployed
2Blackwell (1965) and Sargent (1987).
3Though this paper is concerned with both the distribution of match quality draws and the actual
distribution of accepted draws, “match quality distribution” refers to the former, unless otherwise specified.
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individuals receive exogenous unemployment flow benefits. Next, an exogenous separation
shock s may occur. If it does, unemployment results and the worker does not receive an
employment offer until at least the subsequent period. If a separation does not occur, or if
the worker was already unemployed, then a job-finding shock may occur. Firms and workers
meet each other with a probability that depends only on the worker’s employment status:
α0 for an unemployed worker and α1 for an employed worker. The idiosyncratic productivity
draw x occurs simultaneously with the match shock α, allowing workers to choose between
unemployment and employment (the former being chosen if the productivity draw is such
that the value of unemployment is higher), switching to a new job (occurring, for employed
workers, if the surplus of the new match exceeds that of the present match, in which case
switching costs are paid immediately), and remaining in the old job (occurring if an individ-
ual is already employed and the continuation value of the match exceeds that of all other
alternatives). All job-finding shocks are characterized by a match quality draw and a new
idiosyncratic productivity draw on which wages (fully flexible and instantly renegotiated)
are based. Following this, the economy moves into the new state and the period ends. Note
that the switching cost is considered to be a sunk cost for wage-setting purposes. This is
consistent with the usual practice in most of the hiring cost literature, which can be thought
of as analogous to the switching cost considered here.
The model timing is depicted by the following graph:
wage or b earned s shock α and x shock worker takes action period ends
Idiosyncratic productivity draws are match-specific and time-varying, so it is possible for
workers to switch to lower match quality jobs with sufficiently high productivity draws. x
is drawn from a lognormal distribution with a persistence ρx, following the process ln(x
′) =
ρx ln(x) + εx, where εx ∼ N(0, σ2x).4
4The x grid and discrete transition matrix are formed according to the Tauchen (1986) procedure.
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The worker value function is defined by the following equation
W (m,x) = w(m,x, q) + q + βsU + β(1− s)(1− α1)Prob((U > W (m,x′))|x)U︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad x shock: separate
+ β(1− s)(1− α1)E[1(W (m,x′) ≥ U)W (m,x′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
no job offer: stay in job
+ β(1− s)α1E[max{W (m′, x′nj)− c,W (m,x′), U}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation value conditional on new job offer
,
where w is the observed wage, x is the idiosyncratic shock to the current match, x′nj is the
idiosyncratic shock associated with a new job offer, and β is the discount factor. The latter
enters the firm’s value function linearly. Employed workers separate endogenously from their
jobs, but they also suffer exogenous separation from employment with probability s. α1 and
α0 are the on- and off-the job arrival probabilities, respectively. Workers do not accept all
offers, whether they are initially unemployed or employed. Unemployed workers receive a
flow benefit b. Firms and workers encounter one another at probabilities that depend only on
employment status and are constant over time. Match quality m consists of two components:
a monetary productivity term π that accrues to the firm and a non-monetary benefits term
q that is entirely consumed by the worker. Further, q is not produced by firms; rather, it is
endowed when a worker meets a firm. π draws are distributed according to a normal cdf Π
with mean zero and standard deviation σπ; q draws are distributed according to a normal
cdf Q with mean zero and standard deviation σq. The two are assumed uncorrelated. The





q . A one-time switching cost c is incurred by employed workers who accept
new job offers.
The value of unemployment is similarly defined as
U = b+ β(1− α0)U + βα0Ex′,m′ [W (m′, x′), U ].
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Note that job separations due to bad idiosyncratic draws are bilateral in the sense that
joint surplus from the job is extinguished. This allows the job value function to be written
largely in terms of the worker value function, because the employer sees fit to end a relation-
ship under the same circumstances that motivate a worker to end the job. The job value
function is given below.
J(m,x) =x+ (m− q)− w(m,x, q) + β(1− s)(1− α1)E[1(W (m,x′) ≥ U)J(m,x′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
no job offer: worker stays in job
+ β(1− s)α1E[1((W (m′, x′nj)− c < W (m,x′)) ∩ (W (m,x′) ≥ U))J(m,x′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
worker receives bad offer: stays in job
.
Nash bargaining over the surplus yields the usual wage equation:
(1− γ)(W (m,x)− U) = γJ(m,x),
where γ is the fraction of job surplus going to the worker. The symmetric Nash equilibrium
with γ = 0.5 is solved for throughout. While workers and firms do not care about the
particular composition of m, and hence W and J take m rather than {π, q} as an argument,
the observed wage is a function of q.
Note that not all offers are accepted, which allows a distinction to be made between the
offer arrival probability and the unemployment-employment transition probability. Without
this distinction, endogeneity in the acceptance of offers would potentially bias estimation of
the match quality offer distribution, as discussed previously.
I solve the model through value function iteration on a discrete grid, then simulate a panel
of job spells. Except under very particular assumptions (as in Shimer 2003, for instance)
that would make identification difficult or impossible, on-the-job search and the switching
cost make it impossible to find a closed-form solution to the model.
The baseline model as described above makes use of the fact that π and q, the productivity
and amenity components of match quality, are perfect substitutes. This allows workers and
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firms to care only about the sum m = π + q, which substantially simplifies the numerical
solution of the model. During simulation, however, workers receive distinct draws of π and
q (their distributions conforming to the distribution of m assumed by the model). Though
workers and firms are indifferent between drawing {πlow, qhigh} or {πhigh, qlow}, where πlow +
qhigh = πhigh + qlow, the two draws do generate distinct observed wages. As will be discussed
in the identification section, the correlation between tenure and observed wage allows for
separate identification of the π and q distributions. In Section 2.5.1, the baseline model will
have to be relaxed to take separate account of the two match quality components, because
workers will now prefer to take compensation in the form of untaxed amenities.
2.4 Data
Data is taken from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The NLSY79
is a nationally-representative panel of more than ten thousand young people at inception
in 1979, with periodic successive surveys through the present. The detailed employment,
demographic, and job spell data is necessary for this study, and the panel nature of the data
permits comparison of this paper’s results with those obtained from a more conventional
wage regression approach, which requires person and match fixed effects.
I drop the military and supplemental subsamples. I also drop currently-enrolled high-
school and college students from the sample. This leaves me with about 30,000 primary job
spells. Wages are adjusted by the CPI-U to 2010 dollars. Table 2.1 gives summary statistics
for relevant unweighted NLSY79 variables. Figure 2.1 shows the unweighted empirical tenure
distribution.
Particularly notable is the fact that a surprising fraction of job-to-job wage changes are
negative; fully one third of such wage changes are decreases, though measurement error is
almost certainly exaggerating this figure.5
5Due to concerns about outliers, I use only the middle 95 percentiles of the wage data, making the same
adjustment in the model’s simulations so that only the trimmed data is generated. This mitigates the effect
of error-ridden outliers, though it does not address measurement error more generally.
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Figure 2.1: Unweighted empirical tenure distribution




















Data are weighted to yield a nationally-representative sample before use in the model. I
use the NLSY79’s tenure variables corresponding to the primary jobs of respondents as well
as various demographic variables that allow construction of a conditional tenure distribution.
The tenure variables are constructed by the NLSY using worker-reported job start and stop
dates, and are connected across waves of the survey by means of employer identification
numbers. Demographic and other variables are dated to the end of each completed job spell.
In addition, I set the simulated panel length equal to the average time a worker is present
in my sample. This ensures that any truncation in the data (due to the requirement that
spells terminate before the sample ends) is matched by truncation of the simulated spells.
I do not use the weighted empirical moments directly. Certain observable variables -
age, education, etc. - explain some variation in job duration. Ex ante variation in worker
characteristics is not part of the baseline model, so I prefer to adjust the data to more closely
approximate the model’s assumption of ex ante identical agents. To construct the empirical
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tenure variables, I first run the regression
τit = Xitβ + εit,
where τit is the tenure for a particular person’s completed job spell beginning in year t, Xit
is demographic information associated with a person in year t including age, education, sex,
and race. I experimented with different specifications of industry and occupation dummies,
but these made little difference to the results after the demographic variables were included.
The time-varying variables are taken at the end of a job spell. Since the structural model is
one of homogeneous agents who differ only ex post, I then construct tenure spells that are
purged of observable variation due to age and other variables. The new tenure variable is
given by τ̂it = ε̂it + Xβ̂, where X is the vector of population means corresponding to the
demographic variables. Wages are adjusted in precisely the same way.
2.4.1 Identification
It is well-known that, in expectation, a ranking of jobs by duration corresponds to an
ordering of jobs by match quality (Jovanovic, 1979, Hagedorn and Manovskii, forthcoming).
However, the match quality ranking thus derived is ordinal and not cardinal, and so does not
allow for an examination of match quality variation in relation to any other market quantity
(though it does permit interesting cross-worker comparisons, as in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(forthcoming)). The first contribution of this paper is a model in which the match quality
distribution is identified by duration data, and parameters of the distribution are relatable to
other market quantities. Intuitively, the shape of the tenure distribution identifies the model.
If all job-worker pairings entailed the same match quality (and assuming no idiosyncratic
shocks, for simplicity), workers would never switch jobs. Job endings would come only from
exogenous separations and the induced tenure distribution would be exponential. If jobs were
heterogeneous but switching costs were zero, workers would switch at every higher-match
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quality opportunity.
To better understand this, consider raising the variance of match quality while holding
the mean of the offer distribution constant. One effect is an increase in the incentive to
switch jobs. Since job switching is costly, the higher returns to switching “compress the
tenure distribution”. Put another way, a larger fraction of job offers will be sufficiently
attractive to justify the hassle of moving to new employment, which will cause jobs to
end sooner at all levels of match quality. Second, if the off-the-job arrival probability is
higher than the on-the-job probability, the prospect of even better employment at the high
end of match quality raises the reservation wage of the unemployed. In other words, why
take a mediocre job when the payoff to waiting is much higher? Finally, a more dispersed
match quality offer distribution will lead to a higher steady state average level of match
quality. This last effect (higher dispersion implies higher average match quality) will be
more pronounced when exogenous separations are unlikely and unemployment is generated
primarily by negative idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In simulations at the estimated
parameter vector, this effect is important in the following specific way. All else equal, higher
match quality dispersion means that initial jobs (i.e., after a spell of unemployment) are
likely to be farther from the reservation match quality. Fewer jobs of very short duration
will be induced and destroyed by time-varying x shocks. At the estimated values of the
parameters, this effect dominates for the mean of tenure. All these effects operate differently
at various parts of the tenure distribution, which makes it essential to use multiple moments
of the distribution.
It is also important to note that the unemployment-to-employment transition probabil-
ity is required for identification of the match quality distribution. An economy with many
workers briefly experiencing unemployment will tend to have a more compressed tenure dis-
tribution relative to an economy with a few workers experiencing long unemployment spells.
The unemployment-to-employment transition probability, in conjunction with the tenure
moments, pins down the match quality distribution that generates the observed pattern of
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job spells.
It is not immediately obvious why it it necessary to include job switching costs in the
model. After all, simulated tenure distributions will still move with changes in match quality
variance even when the switching cost is set to zero: though the “incentive to switch” effect
disappears, workers with higher off-the-job arrival probabilities than on-the-job will still set
their reservation wages as a function of the match quality distribution. This implies that
tenure distributions will indeed vary with changes in the parameter of interest. However,
the nature and size of this effect depends entirely on the values of α0 and α1, which are al-
ready pinned down by the empirical unemployment-to-employment and job-to-job transition
probabilities. A stripped-down model with the switching cost restricted to be zero is not
capable of generating the observed variation in tenure spells. The switching cost, in addition
to being required for explanation of the data, has the added virtue of being consistent with
observation.
The correlation between job duration and wage determines the fraction of match quality
that is due to amenities q (and consequently the fraction due to productivity π). Imagine
that match quality was entirely composed of π. In this case, the highest quality matches
would be associated with the highest observed wages (ignoring time-varying idiosyncratic
shocks for the moment), and the correlation between tenure and wage would be perfect. If,
on the other hand, match quality consisted entirely of amenities q, then the observed wage
would be a negative function of match quality (recall the examples presented in Section 2.2).
The correlation between tenure and wages would then be perfectly negative. This does
assume, perhaps counterfactually, that π and q are drawn independently.
Moments of the accepted wage distribution are useful for separately identifying the ex-
ogenous and endogenous components of the separation process. Recall that there exists an
exogenous probability of leaving one’s job, s, and an endogenous process of time-varying id-
iosyncratic shocks with standard deviation σx. The former is unrelated to the wage, while the
latter will induce substantial wage variation. Intuitively, both s and σx affect the unemploy-
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ment rate. Unemployment is clearly increasing in s, since higher inflows to unemployment
will increase the stock, all else equal. Unemployment is also increasing in σx, because the
probability of receiving a very negative x shock rises with σx. By itself, however, the un-
employment rate cannot separately identify the two parameters. Since variance of wages is
rising in σx but not in s, the inclusion of this moment provides for separate identification.
Because I do not want to match the average wage in the data, but rather the unit-less dis-
persion of wages, I construct a moment equal to the standard deviation of wages divided by
the average wage (i.e., the coefficient of variation).
Due to the complexity of identification in this model, I have generated a number of
artificial datasets and proceeded with estimation using the structural model with the intent
of demonstrating that estimation would indeed recover the true parameters. This exercise
also yielded intuition about the relative importance of the effects mentioned previously. For
parameter values near those implied by my data, the “incentive to switch” effect dominates
for the variance of tenure and the “higher dispersion implies higher average match quality”
effect dominates for the mean of tenure. Figure 2.2 reflects this result.
2.4.2 Estimation
I estimate the model using simulated generalized method of moments (SGMM). This
has the virtue of being robust to alternative specifications of the errors, unlike maximum
likelihood estimation, though at some computational cost. Another advantage is that SGMM
is consistent for a finite number of simulations, while simulated maximum likelihood is not.6
As mentioned previously, it is necessary to use the simulated estimator due to some features of
the model, most notably the switching cost and arrival probabilities that vary by employment
status, that render it impossible to find analytic representations of the value functions and
impossible to construct a closed-form relationship between the model’s moments and the
estimated parameters. The parameters {σπ, σq, c, b, α0, α1, s, σx} are estimated. At a monthly
6Ackerberg 2001.
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Figure 2.2: Effect of match quality dispersion





















frequency, ρx and β are calibrated to be 0.916 and 0.996, respectively (Fujita and Nakajima,
2009). σπ and σq are the parameters of interest, and it is the NLSY duration data that pin
down these parameters. The flow benefit to unemployment, b, is a controversial parameter.
Some studies have put it as high as 68 percent of the mean flow output of a job, while others
put it below 40 percent.7 I set the b
flow output
moment to 50 percent of the average flow job
output. The on- and off-the-job arrival probabilities are pinned down in steady state by
the empirical unemployment-to-employment and job-to-job flows recorded in the data. The
correlation of tenure and wage as well as the wage coefficient of variation are obtained from
NLSY data, both using only wages associated with the last period of a job spell. Table 2.2
gives the values of moments, from the NLSY79 and other datasets, that were used during
estimation, along with the values of the simulated moments generated by the model.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 depict the sensitivity of particular moment conditions to deviations
in the structural parameters from their estimated values. The bottom horizontal axis label
7Menzio and Shi (2008) and Shimer (2005), respectively.
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gives the model parameter being manipulated while all other parameters are held constant
at their estimated values, while the top label shows the simulated moment graphed on the
vertical axis. The dashed vertical line is drawn at the estimated value of the parameter.8
Moment-parameter pairs are chosen so to illustrate the source of identification for various
parameters. In particular, the figures show that moments of the tenure distribution are
primarily and jointly affected by the key model parameters of match quality variance and
switching cost.
The simulated method of moments estimator is


























W is the weighting matrix, S is the number of simulations, A is the number of simulated
agents, µ(xa) is the vector of empirical moments, and µ(x(u
s
a, θ)) is the vector of simulated
moments for a particular agent and for a given draw of the simulated errors. The choice of
W is irrelevant to consistency of the estimator, though it has some effect on the efficiency of
the estimator; I set W equal to the identity matrix. Because of the computational resources
required and the negligible benefits, I do not implement efficient SGMM. Since the SGMM
problem is typically characterized by some discontinuity, a Nelder-Mead simplex method is
employed rather than a gradient-based approach for finding the minimum.
The simulated estimator converges in probability to the true θ as the number of agents
approaches infinity:
√
A(θ̂S,A − θ0)→ N(0, QS(W )).
The covariance matrix of the vector of moment conditions is given by9



























8Simulation error is responsible for discrepancies between the simulated moment values shown here and
in the tables.





(µ(xa)− E0µ(xsa(θ))) (µ(xa)− E0µ(xsa(θ)))
′] .
As S approaches infinity, QS(W ) limits to the standard GMM variance-covariance matrix.
2.5 Results
The estimated values of the model’s parameters are in Table 2.3.
The first thing to note from the results is that the standard deviation of the amenity
component of match quality is about four fifths of the standard deviation of the productivity
component. As discussed previously, this reflects the fact that tenure and wages are positively
correlated. The standard deviation of overall match quality π + q is 6.22, but this and the
other parameter values are in terms of “model currency” and must be converted to current
US dollars. Specifically, I multiply the figures by wemp
wsim
, where wemp is the average wage from
the data and wsim is the average simulated wage. Since I assume the correctness of the
underlying model, the average simulated wage is equal to the average empirical wage. The
standard deviation of overall match quality is then 12.19 dollars per hour (2010 dollars). This
number is large, but keep in mind that it reflects the entire offer distribution of matches, a
distribution with support over a wide range of matches that will never be chosen. However,
the large magnitude does indicate that the returns to search are quite high, and that the
typical employed worker would produce vastly disparate social surplus in different randomly
chosen jobs. Unpriced and unobserved (by the econometrician) job amenities are quite large.
Intuitively, the existence of these amenities seems particularly notable when one remembers
that they are match and not job-specific. Large amenity estimates imply large social welfare
gains from efficient coordination of workers and jobs.
I also normalize the standard deviation of accepted match quality to make it comparable
with the data. Since match quality enters the job value function linearly, this allows for
an interpretation of σacceptedm in terms of flow surplus: a one-standard deviation increase in
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σacceptedm increases flow surplus by 8.05 dollars per hour, or 25 percent of average flow surplus.
Note that estimates of the switching cost, while not a focus of this study, are plausible at
nearly four times average monthly income.
Simulated and empirical moments are presented in Table 2.2. The model does not closely
match two particular moments: the unemployment rate and the job-to-job transition proba-
bility. At 0.069, the observed NLSY job-to-job transition probability is quite high: a multiple
of the monthly rate generally thought to obtain in the US labor market (see, for example,
the 0.028 figure calculated using SIPP data by Nagypal, 2008). Our model predicts a sub-
stantially smaller quantity. This is essentially due to the large inframarginal rents implied by
substantial match quality variation: many workers quickly move to matches with high match
quality and then receive comparatively few offers that induce them to quit for either another
job or unemployment. It is perhaps the case that a more flexible framework for match
quality determination - amenity depreciation, for example, or separate offer distributions for
unemployed and employed workers - would more effectively match both the observed tenure
moments and job-to-job transition data.
2.5.1 Taxation and Match Quality
The division of match quality into productivity and amenity suggests an important con-
sequence of the previous analysis: since job amenities cannot be taxed, wage taxation will
impel workers to select into jobs with lower wages and more amenities. Estimation of the
distortion generated on this margin is possible using a version of the model presented. It
will now be necessary to add a state variable and track the distinct components of match
quality.
The social welfare consequences are interesting and somewhat subtle. First, recall that
a relatively simple model of labor supply implies that the taxable income elasticity is a
sufficient statistic for the deadweight loss of an income tax (Feldstein, 1999). Workers adjust
their hours and participation in response to a tax, but they also evade the tax, alter their
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consumption of deductible/tax-excluded consumption, and so forth: all of which are captured
by changes in taxable income but not always by labor supply changes. Consider the following
decision problem, taken with slight modifications from Feldstein (1999).
Let workers maximize the utility function U(L,C,Q,E) subject to the constraint
C = (1− τ)[w(1− L)−Q− E].
L is leisure, C is “ordinary” or taxable consumption, Q is the value of job amenities, E is
all non-taxed consumption aside from amenities, w is the pre-tax wage, and τ is the rate of
wage tax. Feldstein’s insight was that a wage tax, in this setting, causes an increase in the
price of ordinary consumption relative to all other goods, but no change in any other relative
prices (e.g., leisure and tax-excluded consumption). This implies that the deadweight loss
from the tax is a function only of the elasticity of taxable income, assuming a few other
conditions not relevant to this paper, like the absence of fiscal and classic externalities.
Labor search and heterogeneity in match quality create another exception to the original
result. Intuitively, available matches differ in their relative prices of leisure and amenity. The
ability to choose a different, more amenity-intensive match in response to a tax means that
a wage tax changes all relative prices, not just the price of ordinary consumption. Leisure
actually becomes more expensive relative to the amenity, for instance. In the short run, a
new tax τ will only change the relative price of C; as in Feldstein’s setup, initial deadweight
loss will be proportional only to the taxable income elasticity. In the long run, when workers
are able to move to new jobs, the size of the distortion will depend on the match quality
offer distribution and especially the amenity offer distribution.
For this reason, if standard measures of deadweight loss are predicated upon short-run
estimates of taxable income elasticities, deadweight loss will be calculated to be lower than
if long-run taxable income elasticities were employed.10
The search setting considered in this paper is different than the Feldstein (1999) problem,
10This is discussed in Saez et al. (2009), but the difference here is heterogeneity in match quality. This
creates another margin on which distortion occurs only belatedly, exaggerating the short-run/long-run dis-
tinction.
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which is competitive and has fixed wages. Though this paper’s model does not include an
hours margin, one can think of the unemployment-to-employment reservation wage as being
analogous to the intensive margin in the modified Feldstein problem. The exercises conducted
in this section, informed by estimates from the baseline model, help to illuminate the social
welfare effects of taxes. Details of the search process modify the connection between the
taxable income elasticity and the elasticity of social welfare.
Relative to an (otherwise-identical) economy with no match quality variation, the dead-
weight loss of a tax is higher in my baseline model. In the no variation economy, the only
channel through which wage taxes reduce welfare is the unemployed workers’ reservation wage
(and consequently the unemployment rate). With match variation, workers are impelled by
the tax to select higher-amenity, lower-wage jobs, which generates its own distortion.11
Inclusion of wage taxation requires an elaboration of the baseline model presented above.
Assuming that the tax is paid by workers, the value functions are now
W (π, q, x) = (1− τ)w(π, q, x) + q + βsU + β(1− s)(1− α1)Prob((U > W (π, q, x′))|x)U︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad x shock: separate
+ β(1− s)(1− α1)E[1(W (π, q, x′) ≥ U)W (π, q, x′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
no job offer: stay in job
+ β(1− s)α1E[max{W (π′, q′, x′nj)− c,W (π, q, x′), U}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation value conditional on new job offer
,
where τ is the wage tax rate and other parameters are defined as before: w is the observed
wage, x is the idiosyncratic shock to the current match, x′nj is the idiosyncratic shock as-
sociated with a new job offer, and β is the discount factor. s is the exogenous separation
probability, and α1 and α0 are the on- and off-the job arrival probabilities, respectively. Un-
11The Nash bargaining assumption of this paper’s model will enhance the taxable income elasticity relative
to the simpler model discussed in Section 2.2. In the simpler model, workers were paid their monetary
productivities. In the baseline model, workers and firms bargain over job surplus, and both know that this
includes an amenity. Observed wages in jobs with higher amenity levels will be lower, which increases the
incentive for a worker to bypass income tax through selection of higher-amenity jobs.
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employed workers receive a flow benefit b. Firms and workers encounter one another with
probabilities that depend only on employment status and are constant over time. Match
quality m consists of two components: a monetary productivity term π that accrues to the
firm and a non-monetary benefits term q that is entirely consumed by the worker. Further,
q is not produced by firms; rather, it is endowed when a worker meets a firm. π draws are
distributed according to a normal cdf Π with mean zero and standard deviation σπ; q draws
are distributed according to a normal cdf Q with mean zero and standard deviation σq. The
two are assumed uncorrelated. The sum of these draws m then obeys a normal cdf M with




q . A one-time switching cost c is incurred
by employed workers who accept new job offers.
The unemployment value function is
U = b+ β(1− α0)U + βα0Ex′,π′,q′ [W (π′, q′, x′), U ].
The job value function is now
J(π, q, x) =x+ π − w(π, q, x) + β(1− s)(1− α1)E[1(W (π, q, x′) ≥ U)J(π, q, x′)]
+ β(1− s)α1E[1((W (π′, q′, x′nj)− c < W (π, q, x′)) ∩ (W (π, q, x′) ≥ U))J(π, q, x′)].
Social welfare is the steady state flow surplus x+m associated with a job, summed over all




(1(employedit = 1) · (wit)). Both social welfare and taxable income
are normalized to 100 in the absence of taxation. Note that job switching costs are not
considered to be tax-deductible. A substantial portion of switching costs are non-monetary,
and many workers in the data do not itemize their deductions in any event. Social welfare,
taxable income, and corresponding tax elasticities are given in Table 2.4 and illustrated in
Figure 2.3.
The tax distortion is highly nonlinear in the level of the tax. While a ten percentage
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point tax increase leaves welfare almost unchanged when starting from an untaxed economy,
a ten percentage point tax increase from 40 to 50 percentage points causes a reduction in
social welfare of about 2.5 percentage points. The deadweight loss at a 40 percent tax rate
is 3.0 percentage points of social welfare.
Recall, however, that the original Feldstein result suggests that the response of taxable
income to the tax rate is sufficient to understand social welfare consequences. It is clear that
this result is violated in the model considered here, but perhaps not clear in which direction
the bias runs: are we likely to be overstating or understating the deadweight loss of a tax in
the presence of match-specific amenity variation?
To answer this question, I conduct the following experiment. Divide the standard devi-
ation of offered amenity variation, σq, by two and increase the standard deviation of offered
productivity variation, σπ, by enough to hold σm constant. This allows us to isolate the effect
of a change in the extent of amenity variation. Now I generate the same taxable income and
social welfare curves shown previously in Table 2.4. If the econometrician underestimates
amenity variation in this manner, Table 2.5 and Figure 2.4 show that social welfare and
taxable income will be thought to be approximately identical. In reality, however, taxable
income is increasingly overstating the social welfare decline as σq rises.
This may seem counterintuitive, since the introduction of amenities leads to an addi-
tional distortion: the endogenous mix of amenity and monetary productivity responds to
taxation, moving away from optimal levels as the tax increases. However, taxable income
will respond more dramatically. Imagine an arbitrarily small tax dτ applied to an economy
that is currently implementing a socially optimal equilibrium. It is clear that this tax gen-
erates no deadweight loss, since the no-tax allocation is efficient. In terms of social welfare,
any reduction in wage income is matched by an increase in utility from the amenity. By the
same token, however, the tax will generate a reduction in taxable income. This is indeed
what we observe in Figure 2.3.
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2.5.2 Application to Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance is one of the most important policies for which estimates of
match quality and returns to search are directly relevant. In an economy with no labor
market comparative advantage (no match quality heterogeneity) and risk neutral workers,
unemployment insurance would serve only to tax labor and reduce employment below the
optimal level. Various considerations complicate the calculation of optimal UI, not least
of which is the heterogeneity of match quality. This section contains an exercise that is
informative about the relationship between match quality and the optimal unemployment
insurance benefit.
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that unemployment insurance can induce higher pro-
ductivity by allowing workers to search for higher-quality jobs. Several authors have con-
ducted reduced-form analyses of changes in unemployment insurance law, with mixed evi-
dence of an effect of UI (unemployment insurance) generosity on subsequent job duration.
Ours and Vodopivec (2008) examine a change in Slovenian law and see no significant effect
on subsequent tenure. Belzil looks specifically at UI benefit duration, rather than the level of
the benefit, and finds that “increasing the maximum benefit duration by one week will raise
expected unemployment duration by 1.0 to 1.5 days but expected job duration by 0.5 to 0.9
days only.” (p.635, Belzil (2001)) Mario Centeno, in a number of papers, finds substantial
post-unemployment job duration effects (2004, 2006, and 2009).
The baseline model unambiguously predicts that more generous unemployment insurance,
implemented via a higher flow benefit to unemployment b, induces higher match quality
and longer job spells, albeit at the cost of lower aggregate employment. The advantage of
the structural approach is that it is possible to speak precisely about UI welfare effects.
The model shows the effect a change in b has on the entire accepted distribution of match
quality, which in conjunction with a social welfare function is sufficient to find the full welfare
consequences. Note that amenities are unimportant in this experiment, in contrast to the
tax application. The match quality offer distribution is the object of interest.
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It is possible, however, that match quality variation is sufficiently negligible as to allow
it to be ignored in the setting of unemployment insurance policy. The exercise shown below
is evidence against this possibility.
Social welfare in a steady state period is given by
I∑
i
(1(employedit = 1)(xit +mit))−
I∑
i
(1(jobswitchit = 1)c .
Socially optimal b values are calculated by assuming all the other estimated parameters, then
maximizing (through simulation) the expression above with respect to b. The assumption
of risk neutrality is unrealistic, though consistent with the permanent income hypothesis.
Accordingly, the “optimal” UI benefits calculated here should be understood primarily as a
useful way to isolate the effects of match quality dispersion. Introducing an insurance motive
to the model would complicate this.
The UI benefit chosen by policymakers operates through the reservation wage (for move-
ment from unemployment) and the threshold wage required for a job switch. Higher benefits
induce both higher unemployment and higher average match quality, since workers optimally
search longer when the cost is reduced.
This paper conducts an exercise in which estimated variation in match quality is halved
and socially optimal UI benefits compared between the two cases. The primary tradeoff in
this economy is between reduced output from added unemployment (associated with higher
b) and worse job mismatch (associated with lower b). Workers do not internalize all the
benefits of search because firms receive a portion of the rents from employment. Results are
shown in Table 2.6.
The socially optimal flow benefit to unemployment more than doubles when the standard
deviation of match quality doubles to the estimated value. Perhaps more informatively, the
ratio of the optimal UI benefit over average flow surplus rises by 14 percentage points. This
gives an indication of the importance of accurate match quality measurements to unemploy-
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ment insurance policy.
2.5.3 Comparison with Conventional Match Quality Estimates Based on Wages
The estimates shown above come from a very different model than most that have been
tasked to address match quality. They are likely to differ for many reasons that have already
been discussed, but comparisons of the results may be instructive.
Discussion of labor market comparative advantage typically begins with wage variation.
In an economy with no non-monetary job amenities, a fixed-effects analysis incorporating
all relevant time-varying factors will be sufficient to reveal the fraction of wage dispersion
due to match quality variation. However, since only accepted wages are observed, the match
quality distribution implied by this analysis is the accepted match distribution and not the
offered. This is unfortunate in that the underlying, unobserved offer distribution is the more
important object for several purposes, including an understanding of the returns to search
and optimal unemployment insurance. An unemployed worker will set a reservation wage
that is a function of the wage offer distribution, not the accepted wage distribution.
The model presented in this paper is capable of recovering both the accepted and offer
distributions, which permits a comparison between the results thus obtained and the results
produced by a wage regression approach. In finite samples, however, the latter method will
overestimate the extent of match quality heterogeneity, even assuming away non-monetary
amenities. This is because persistent, time-varying idiosyncratic productivity shocks - in-
corporated in the model as the log AR(1) process ln(x′) = ρx ln(x) + εx, εx ∼ N(0, σ2x) -
generate wage variation that only limits to zero as the number of observations per match
limits to infinity. Wages are increasing in both m and x, and a persistent, high x shock
at the outset of one job will raise the average wage paid relative to an otherwise identical,
low x shock job taken by the same person. With a typical persistence ρ = 0.9, the half-life
of a shock, in logs, is about 6.5 months, so it is not the case that productivity shocks are
decaying too quickly to meaningfully affect the average wage at a job. In simulated panels
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generated at the estimated parameters, I find a substantial small-sample positive bias to the
wage regression estimates of match quality variation. This bias is strongly increasing in the
persistence ρ.
Using the wage regression approach mentioned previously, I calculate the component
of wage variation due to match quality variation from the same NLSY79 data. The wage
regression is of the form:
wit = XitβX + θi + µij + εit,
where w is the observed wage, Xit is a vector of demographic characteristics, θi is an indi-
vidual fixed effect, µij is a match-specific fixed effect, and εit is a time-varying error term.
In addition to the previously-discussed weaknesses of the wage-based approach, there is
one more practical problem with extracting a match quality estimate from wage information.
Wages are highly skewed even after controlling for observables and individual fixed effects,
in part due to what appear to be coding errors in the NLSY79. Measurement error in wages
creates difficulties for any approach to estimating match quality that relies principally on
wage data.
As described above, I calculate the standard deviation of µij, with wages trimmed at the
cutoffs12 of $0.1 and $1000, to be $14.18 per hour. However, with more aggressive trimming
that keeps only the middle 95 percentiles, the same figure is $6.53 per hour. This suggests
that the treatment of measurement error and outliers in a wage decomposition is quite impor-
tant, and potentially makes the results sensitive to the assumptions made. For comparison,
recall that the standard deviation of accepted match quality was estimated to be $8.05 per
hour. Note, however, that the estimates are not strictly comparable, in that the structural
model produces estimates of match quality proper, while the wage regression produces esti-
mates of the (wage) variation ascribable to match quality. Under certain assumptions these




This project is built on two literatures and two seminal papers: labor search (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994) and job duration as match quality (Jovanovic, 1979). Mortensen
and Pissarides provide the basic framework for the random search model employed in this
paper, albeit without on-the-job search and a few other modifications. Working within the
Mortensen and Pissarides class of model, Shimer (2006) adds on-the-job search in a partial
equilibrium context, with job offers arriving at an exogenous rate constrained to be the same
on and off the job.
Jovanovic (1979) and related papers like McCall (1990) provide a theoretical basis for
the assertion that tenure is informative about job match quality, embedding match quality
variation in an equilibrium model of job turnover. A large, mostly empirical literature has
developed that takes tenure as a proxy for match quality and examines, for example, job
mismatch over the business cycle (Bowlus, 1995) and the effects of changes in unemployment
insurance law (Ours and Vodopivec, 2008). Papers in the latter category are discussed briefly
in Section 2.5.2. Some authors have pursued related questions with identification or cali-
bration strategies making use of duration data. Nagypal (2007), for instance, distinguishes
accumulation of human capital from learning about match quality using, in part, matched
firm-worker data including tenure information. Becker (2009) focuses on job amenities and
finds that they are quantitatively substantial.
Paul Sullivan and Ted To assess the relative importance of non-wage and wage job utility
in a 2011 working paper. They estimate the offer distributions of wages and non-wage utility
in a search context, and use the fraction of job switches associated with wage declines to
identify the distribution of non-wage utility. Although they are not concerned with estimat-
ing the distribution of match quality, like Becker, Sullivan and To find non-wage utility to
be substantial.
Though this paper is not explicitly about compensating differentials, separate estimation
of productivity and amenities, along with the particular wage bargain assumed, implicitly
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involve tradeoffs between wages and amenities. As is intuitively the case, workers in jobs
with low amenities will (holding match quality constant) receive higher wages. The baseline
model makes use of wages to help separate productivity and amenities, which puts it in debt
of papers like Rosen (1974) and Friedman and Kuznets (1954). Unlike most compensating
differentials papers, however, this paper does not assume equality of utility across options
and the focus is on parameters of the aggregate match quality distributions rather than any
cross-sectional tradeoffs.
A large theoretical and empirical literature has developed around the explanation and
decomposition of wage dispersion in an on-the-job search context. Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) construct a variant of the Burdett and Mortensen model that they use to decompose
wage variation into person, firm and “market friction” contributions. The latter does not
include match quality variation, as it is simply the wage dispersion endogenously generated
by the Burdett-Mortensen structure. Mortensen (2003) discusses similar explanations for
wage dispersion. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) take a less structural approach, estimating
the variance of match quality from wage data in a multi-step procedure that subtracts the
contributions of tenure, experience, fixed effects, and within-job wage shocks, obtaining
match quality variation as a residual.
On-the-job search models typically predict that all job changes will be associated with
increases in observed wages. However, this is decidedly not the case in the data13, and
various solutions have been proposed. Of course, some or all of wage declines associated
with job-to-job transitions can be interpreted as measurement error. In the NLSY79, for
instance, that some reported wage declines are spurious is explicitly noted by the survey
administrators.14 Wolpin (1987) and related literature explicitly incorporate measurement
error into their models. It is difficult to explain the extent of job-to-job transitions that
13See Sullivan and To (2011) for data from the NLSY97. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) find a similar
result in French data, with a third to a half of workers reporting wage decreases as they change jobs.
14From NLSY79 documentation at http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/wages.htm:
“Note that: the calculation procedure, which factors in each respondent’s usual wage, time unit of pay, and
usual hours worked per day/per week produces, at times, extremely low and extremely high pay rate values;
no editing of values reported by a respondent occurs even if the value is extreme, such as $25,000 per hour...”
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involve wage declines with measurement error alone, considering, for instance, that a full
third of job-to-job wage changes in the NLSY79 are reductions. Another approach is to
construct some aspect of the model that leads workers to (occasionally) optimally switch to
lower-wage jobs. As an example, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) use
a bargaining arrangement that allows workers to choose lower-wage but higher-productivity
firms that will in the future be able to better match outside offers. The present paper,
though not principally motivated by the concern of wage reductions in job-to-job transitions,
provides a different answer to this question. When unpriced amenities are accounted for,
optimal wage choice is such that workers will frequently choose lower-wage jobs that are
nonetheless preferred to previous jobs due to their superior amenities.
2.7 Future Work
A large theoretical and empirical literature has developed around the question of cyclical
variation in productivity and labor match quality. The model developed above could be
used to evaluate the competing theoretical models describing the cyclical evolution of match
quality. The degree of labor market specialization is expected to vary cyclically; this vari-
ation is informative about the size and timing of the welfare costs of recessions. Using the
match quality offer distribution estimated previously, I can simulate the effect of a recession
on average and marginal realized match quality at various lags, tracing out the so-called
“cleansing” and “sullying” effects of recessions (Barlevy, 2002). The cleansing effect is rela-
tively well-known, as it refers to the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction operating
in the labor market. Recessions lower the joint surplus to employment across the board,
which destroys the least productive jobs and impels workers and firms to search for better
matches. In this way, a recession may immediately raise average labor productivity. The
“sullying” effect is a more recent coinage that refers to the ongoing and gradual reduction
in average labor productivity generated by the reduced search effort expended during a re-
cession. As workers move up the match quality ladder more slowly during a period of low
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aggregate productivity, average labor productivity gradually diminishes.
Another avenue for future research is accounting for ex ante individual heterogeneity.
I plan to add ex ante effects to the model. This will serve the dual purposes of making
explicit the robustness of σm estimation to individual fixed effects, as well as generating an
endogenous positive correlation between π and q, which is more in keeping with observation.
Identification of these ex ante differences will require a more extensive use of NLSY79 wage
moments.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, coauthored with Brendan Epstein, we elaborate
on the theory of the wage tax distortion, the relationship between match quality and social
welfare with endogenous amenity supply, and implications of the dynamic aspect of the wage
tax distortion, among other things. Search is not required to generate the distortion on the
amenity margin, which exists in more general settings. We plan to examine a model with
rigid wages but flexible amenity supply, which may generate interesting results consistent
with stylized facts of the business cycle.
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2.8 Appendix
The model’s objects are recovered from a simulated steady state in which all the objects
are stationary. I simulated 40,000 agents over 724 periods, the latter being selected to match
the average duration of a subject’s participation in the NLSY79 sample. As with the data,
the simulated panel does select on job spells that end prior to the last month generated.
Note that exogenous separations are helpful for speeding the transition to steady state in
models with on-the-job search; workers with higher match quality are less likely to receive
a sufficiently negative idiosyncratic shock to induce unemployment, and exogenous shocks
keep the job quality ladder from becoming too top-heavy.
Two key grids were constructed: one for time-invariant job-specific match quality, and
one for time-varying idiosyncratic productivity. The latter was defined on a grid with Nx = 9,
with the grid and the transition matrix generated according to the Tauchen (1986) algorithm,
but modified to provide a grid of equiprobable (not equidistant) points.15 This modification
is somewhat more efficient, as it does not waste time with grid points that are unlikely to be
reached through the log AR(1) process. The second important grid is that of match quality,
with Nm = 12. I interpolate during simulation rather than dramatically increasing the grid
size. The matrices used to form expectations over possible jobs, for purposes of deriving the
value function, are in general several-dimensional arrays with size increasing exponentially in
Nx and Nm, so the computational problem quickly becomes intractable as the grids become
finer.
As previously mentioned, value function iteration is employed and the workers simulated
to follow the associated policy functions. Value functions W (m,x)U ,and J(m,x) along with
a wage grid wgrid(m,x) are initialized for all values of the support, with wgrid simply a
deterministic function of the value functions, assuming Nash bargaining. This is possible
because the wage enters linearly into both the worker and firm value functions, allowing the
i − 1 iteration of the wage to be subtracted (added) from the worker (firm) value function
15Ryan Michaels, correspondence.
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before calculating the ith iteration: wgrid′ = γ(J + W − U) − (W − U) + wgrid. Value
functions are repeatedly generated, assuming the correctness of the previous iteration of
value functions, until the discrepancy across iterations becomes small.
During simulation, records are made of every relevant variable. Random shocks are drawn
before simulation for all of the stochastic variables and held constant as model parameters
change. Very few simulations are required to substantially reduce error relative to the GMM
estimator.16 For computational reasons, I generate only two simulated panels for each value
of the parameter vector, which is enough to obtain precise estimates when the panel is













1. Data are from the NLSY79.
Mean1
7.6% Hispanic, 13.1% black, 79.3% 
non-black,non-Hispanic
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mean tenure 30.3 30.5
variance of tenure 1419 1419
skewness of tenure 2.34 2.29
b as a fraction of flow output 0.417 0.500
unemployment rate 0.043 0.065
job-to-job probability 0.012 0.069
unemployment-to-employment probability 0.267 0.193
wage tenure correlation 0.140 0.225
wage coefficient of variation 0.461 0.489
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0 percent 100.0 100.0
10 percent 99.6 92.2 0.04 0.77
20 percent 98.9 89.1 0.05 0.29
30 percent 98.1 86.7 0.06 0.20
40 percent 97.0 83.4 0.08 0.26
50 percent 94.5 75.4 0.14 0.55
60 percent 91.9 67.8 0.12 0.47
70 percent 87.8 56.5 0.16 0.63
80 percent 82.2 41.9 0.16 0.74
90 percent 75.9 26.1 0.12 0.68
1. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at a 0 percent tax rate.












Table 2.5: Effects of wage taxation with reduced amenity variation
table4_2
Page 1
0 percent 100.0 100.0
10 percent 99.3 98.3 0.06 0.16
20 percent 98.1 96.7 0.10 0.14
30 percent 96.7 96.2 0.11 0.04
40 percent 94.8 95.4 0.13 0.05
50 percent 91.9 92.7 0.17 0.15
60 percent 86.1 86.5 0.29 0.31
70 percent 76.9 76.1 0.39 0.45
80 percent 55.1 48.9 0.82 1.09
90 percent 46.0 39.4 0.26 0.31
1. Standard deviation of amenity variation is halved relative to baseline.
2. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at a 0 percent tax rate.













Table 2.6: Optimal unemployment insurance
table5
Page 1
Estimated match quality Half estimated match quality
Optimal UI benefit 7.5 3.0
45.7% 31.5%
1. The benefit ratio is the UI benefit divided by the average flow output.
UI benefit ratio1
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0.65 0.2 99.55 95.70
1.14 0.3 99.17 94.37
2.84 0.4 98.36 91.26
10.41 0.5 96.79 85.98
14.42 0.6 93.05 77.50
29.24 0.7 88.53 68.86
49.66 0.8 81.84 56.90
72.16 0.9 71.86 39.19
DWL calculated from Harberger formula using only Feldstein elasticities



































DWL calculated from Harberger formula using only Feldstein elasticities












1. Standard deviation of amenity variation is halved relative to baseline.


















































Figure 2.6: Sensitivity of simulated moments to parameters
















ratio of b to flow output























Accounting for Adaptation in the Economics of
Happiness
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, researchers have increasingly turned to survey data on subjective well-
being (happiness) to investigate a wide range of economic questions. Happiness data have
been used to study preferences over inflation and unemployment (Di Tella et al., 2001), the
consequences of excise taxes (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005), and the progress of women
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009), to take just a few examples. The interpretation of responses
to survey questions about happiness varies with the study. Some have taken these measures
of recent mood or life-satisfaction as indicators of utility (e.g., Oswald and Powdthavee,
2008). Others have viewed happiness measures as outcomes of intrinsic interest analagous
to health or income (e.g., Deaton et al., 2008).
While, in practice, the use of happiness data is often controversial, the idea of measuring
an individual’s recent mood or life-satisfaction has important potential. Taken simply as
an outcome, it is natural to view an individual’s emotional state or level of satisfaction as,
at least, an important aspect of her well-being. Taken as an indicator of utility, happiness
data provide an opportunity to infer an individual’s preferences under circumstances, such
as the presence of externalities, non-market goods, or cognitive biases, where choices and
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prices alone will typically be inadequate. The potential value of these measures motivates
the adaptation and development of tools for rigorous economic analysis of happiness data.
This paper is concerned with a feature of happiness data that has not, as yet, been
thoroughly accomodated by economic analysis: “hedonic adaptation.” Hedonic adapation
refers to a dynamic response of happiness to changes in life-circumstances; the magnitude
of the response decreases as the change fades into the past. In a variety of studies, using a
variety of methods, evidence often indicates that happiness responds in expected ways to the
arrival of both good and bad events, but individuals return to their prior levels of mood with
surprising thoroughness and speed.1 In a canonical example, people are much less happy
upon the arrival of a serious health problem (paraplegia, renal failure) but eventually appear
to adapt and reveal measured happiness at or near normal levels (Riis et al., 2005). The idea
that happiness quickly adapts to changes in income has been central to investigations of the
Easterlin Paradox, but hedonic adaptation has not otherwise been thoroughly incorporated
into economic analysis of happiness data.
Much of economists’ work in happiness economics has been at a macro level, explor-
ing topics like unemployment/inflation tradeoffs (Di Tella et al., 2001) and making use of
country-level data like the Gallup World Poll (Deaton et al., 2008). The same methods,
when applied to individual-level data, become more controversial. Even if happiness self-
reports are a useful proxy for utility, regressions making use of them are subject to the usual
endogeneity concerns. The panel nature of our data helps us to address two concerns of this
kind. First, one might imagine that news about subjective well-being-relevant events is likely
to arrive prior to an event’s occurrence. The econometric strategy developed here is able
to accommodate this possibility. In addition, our analysis incorporates person-specific fixed
effects. Cross-sectional individual-level data does not permit this, and selection will likely be
important. Furthermore, this paper focuses on high-frequency SWB variation around events
that are plausibly unexpected by survey respondents. This all gives us more confidence that
1Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) offer a review of this evidence. Diener et al. (2006) review evidence
on the limits of hedonic adaptation.
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happiness consequences are properly identified.
The innovation of this paper is in the treatment of individual adaptation to SWB-relevant
events. Previous work has largely ignored adaptation or dealt with it in an insufficiently gen-
eral way. This paper demonstrates that events have widely differing hedonic consequences,
both in magnitude and in composition (e.g., temporary vs. permanent effects). Analyses
that assume all hedonic consequences to be permanent will necessarily err in the comparison


















Figure 3.1: Two health events in the HRS
Figure 3.1 illustrates some of the differences in hedonic adaptation that require explicit
consideration. The graphs depict smoothed SWB measurements (ranging 0−100), averaged
across all respondents, at varying temporal distance from event occurrence. First, note
that reported well-being drops prior to the month in which illness occurs (anticipation).
Second, while the overall drops in happiness are roughly comparable across the two events,
respondents report persistent happiness reductions in the wake of a stroke, while most of the
initial happiness drop after cancer diagnosis is regained in later months. To the extent that
the hedonic response to an event contains a temporary component, the rate of recovery may
also be of interest.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, the related literature is discussed in Section 3.1.1.
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The econometric approach taken in previous work is described in Section 3.1.2, and limita-
tions of the identification are discussed. The model is then presented in Section 3.2, along
with multiple variants of the baseline specification, and in Section 3.2.2 a procedure for com-
paring our results to previous work is developed. In Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, data and
results are then presented, with a discussion and conclusion following.
3.1.1 Related Literature
The subjective well-being literature was advanced by early papers like Andrews and
Withey (1976), Bradburn (1969), Campbell et al. (1976) that explored the potential use-
fulness of survey questions on happiness. The use of SWB data has been controversial,
however. Schwarz and Strack (1999) and Schwarz (1987) describe some of the difficulties
with interpretation of reported happiness data, including specifically the temporary and
context-dependent nature of the reports. It is also the case that SWB is not always best
conceived of as a straightforward proxy for utility; Benjamin et al. (2010) show evidence for
systematic discrepancies between SWB and revealed preference utility. Kimball and Willis
(2010) develop a theory that reconciles the two.
Hedonic adaptation has been the focus of substantial recent work2. If adaptation and
relative income are important in the determination of SWB, a number of implications follow
for cross-sectional individual and national data, as well as optimal taxation, consumption,
and other topics (Clark et al., 2008b). Concerns about “set points” (SWB levels to which
individuals eventually return after a disturbance) and the measurement of happiness are
explored in Diener et al. (2006). Clark et al. (2008a) looks for permanent SWB responses to
various events, generally not finding significant effects. Bottan and Truglia (2011) present ev-
idence indicating that happiness itself is positively autocorrelated. Oswald and Powdthavee
(2008) and Powdthavee (2009) investigate adaptation in the wake of disability and widowing.
They acknowledge the importance of hedonic adaptation but emphasize the mutability and
2For a review of some of the literature on the topic, see Frederick and Loewenstein (1999).
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heterogeneity of set points.
The choice of SWB measure may matter for estimates of hedonic adaptation and the
decomposition of SWB effects into temporary and permanent components. Life satisfaction
in the German Socioeconomic Panel, as used by Headey et al. (2010) and Lucas et al. (2004),
occasionally behaves differently than happiness variables we observe in the HRS.
3.1.2 Previous work
Several authors estimate the impact of life events on happiness using a cross-sectional
regression that includes indicator variables for various events. In particular, Deaton et al.
(2008) use the following specification with individual-level data from the Gallup World Poll:
Hit = αc +XitβX + YitβY + 1itβ1 + εit, (3.1)
where H is a SWB measure, αc is a vector of country fixed effects, X is a vector of demo-
graphic variables, Y is log income, and 1 is a vector of dummies for the death of a family
member from a given disease in the last twelve months. Without the possibility of individual
fixed effects, the authors rely on the assumption that “baseline mood” (i.e., the SWB level
reported before an event) is not systematically different across respondents in a way that is
endogenous to the specification.
Other papers exploit country-level data. As mentioned previously, Di Tella et al. (2001)
run regressions of the following form.
LSct = αc + UctβX + ΠctβI + εct,
where LS is a modified life satisfaction measure, U is the unemployment rate, Π is the
inflation rate, and αc is a vector of country fixed effects. Finkelstein et al. (2008) utilize
individual panel data and estimate the following equation, among others:
57
Hit = αi +XitβX + YitβY + 1itβ1 + (1it ∗ Yit)βint + εit, (3.2)
where H is a SWB measure, αc is a vector of country fixed effects, X is a vector of demo-
graphic variables, Y is log income, and 1 is a vector of dummies for whether a respondent
has ever had a particular disease. The effect of the interaction between income and health
events is given by βint. However, this panel approach still fails to distinguish immediate con-
sequences from enduring effects. Because there is evidence that adaptation occurs, we prefer
a method that allows for dynamic happiness responses. Further, we find that life events vary
significantly in the ratio of temporary to permanent happiness effects and dynamic methods
are necessary to properly compare them.
3.2 Model
The primary motivation for our baseline specification is a desire to address hedonic adap-
tation in a flexible and tractable fashion. A nonparametric approach would make excessive
demands on the (often sparse and incomplete) data, but a pooled cross-sectional or fixed
effects regression fails to recognize the substantial and nonlinear adaptation characteristic
of the data. Our specification is nonlinear but quick to estimate. Furthermore, as will be
demonstrated below, the method generally returns reasonable results.
3.2.1 Baseline specification
Our dynamic approach can be interpreted in an event-study framework. News contained
in the occurrence of important life events will have an immediate effect on self-reported hap-
piness, one component of which will be permanent and the other temporary. The temporary
component is assumed to decay exponentially at a rate that is specific to the type of event
(i.e., different decay rates are estimated for heart attacks and strokes).
The simplest form of our dynamic equation is given below. In essence, it decomposes
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the cumulative happiness response into an immediate, temporary effect that decays expo-
nentially, and a permanent effect that persists indefinitely. The temporary effect is assumed
to vanish exponentially at rate δ.3 Since many life events have important consequences for
income or are related to income levels, we include the log level of household income as a
covariate. The estimating equation is given by
Hit = αi︸︷︷︸
fixed effect
+ YitβY︸ ︷︷ ︸
income effect





] + εit, (3.3)
where H is a SWB measure ranging 0 − 100, t is the time that happiness is observed, t0
is the time the event occurs, βY is the income effect, βP is the permanent effect, βT is the
temporary effect, αi is the person fixed effect, and δ is the rate of decay of the shock. Since δ
enters the equation nonlinearly, we use nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimation. The NLS
estimator is given by




[yi − f(xi; θ)]2,
where f(xt; θ) is the nonlinear model, y is the endogenous variable, N is the number of
observations, and θ is the parameter vector.
With some SWB-relevant events, it may be the case that the likelihood of occurrence is
related to baseline mood. This may be the case even if the event is unanticipated by the
respondent. For instance, health problems such as heart attacks may be induced by stress,
which could itself imply lower baseline mood. Since the healthy respondents report higher
SWB, the effect of a heart attack will be over-estimated with a specification that fails to
account for the already-lower baseline mood of respondents who are about to have heart
attacks. To account for these differences in baseline mood, we include individual-specific
fixed effects.
3We experimented with less restrictive specifications but found no evidence of non-exponential decay.
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3.2.2 Comparability with previous estimates
For some purposes, it may be interesting to consider the cumulative impact of an event.
In particular, some of the estimates in previous work (along the lines of equations 3.1 and 3.2)
have an interpretation as the cumulative SWB consequence of an event. For comparability
with these results, we adapt our baseline specification, equation 3.3, by integrating to find
the total effect. For an individual with d annual mortality risk and interest rate r, the “area










d+ r + δ
(3.4)
This formulation gives a single statistic that can be used to rank events by their hedonic
importance. It also allows for comparison of our dynamic results with the previous literature’s
static estimates, since both are measures of a cumulative hedonic effect. Following previous
work, the fixed effects regression
Hit = αi + YitβY + 1itβ1 + εit, (3.5)
is conducted to make this comparison of our results with the usual linear specification.
1it is an “absorbing state” indicator, which means that it is set to 1 for all observations after
the initial event occurrence. This is consistent with some of the previous SWB literature
(e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2008) and aims to capture a cumulative SWB effect. Were 1it to
equal 1 only in the initial event occurrence observation, β1 would capture only a portion of
the temporary SWB consequences, and would not be comparable to our cumulative results.
The chief virtue of our baseline specification is its ability to separately identify temporary
and permanent SWB effects. While important in its own right, mean reversion also compli-
cates estimation of the cumulative happiness effect. In equation 3.5, β1 is only identical to
βP in equation 3.3 if βT = 0. For βT > 0, equation 3.5 may imply a different estimate of the
cumulative SWB effect than equation 3.3. Consider the ordinal ranking of SWB-relevant
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events by β1. Since the specification of equation 3.5 makes no use of time since occurrence,
this parameter will depend on the probability that a respondent subsequently leaves the
sample, which may differ across events. For example, an event that is substantially mean-
reverting may be associated with subsequent SWB observations over many years. Another
event, with the same balance of temporary and permanent effects, may have relatively few
subsequent SWB observations. Assume, for specificity, that both temporary and permanent
effects are negative in sign. For the event with few post-occurrence observations, β1 will be
estimated to be larger in magnitude, because the temporarily depressed SWB values just






do not depend on these factors, but are estimated consistently
if the underlying model is correct. Rankings of SWB-relevant events based on the latter
expression will then be different, in general, than a ranking based on β1.
3.2.3 Allows for various sorts of decompositions
One interesting extension of this method involves subjective life expectancy. Some life
events, in particular health events like heart attacks and strokes, will in general have im-
portant consequences for life expectancy. The original dynamic specification, equation 3.3,
can be modified to examine the role of subjective life expectancy changes in creating the
observed hedonic effects. A particular implementation is given below:
Hit = αi + YitβY + χi1(t >= t0)[βP + (βT + η∆SLE)e
−δ(t−t0)] + εit, (3.6)
where SLE is a constructed measure of subjective life expectancy, denominated in years,
and η is the temporary effect of changes in subjective life expectancy.
3.2.4 Anticipation
In order for our interpretation of the baseline specification to be correct, it must be the
case that the “news” component of event happiness consequences does not occur prior to
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the event itself. In other words, respondents must not learn of and (in terms of subjective
well-being) react to an event that has yet to occur. Since this assumption is likely violated
in a number of cases, we include as a control a dummy for SWB in the six-month period
prior to an event. This is done for all the paper’s results. If news about the event generates
a change in SWB prior to the event date, our modified specification will correctly capture
the consequences of the event itself (as opposed to news of the event) in the parameters
βP , βT , δ.
3.2.5 Sparse data
Another advantage of our method is that it can be easily modified to handle infrequently-
measured data. For instance, with all the HRS data, we posit an underlying continuous-time
data generating process, with the happiness data only observed periodically (every two years
in the core of the HRS). Some of the SWB-relevant events are dated precisely to the month
in which they occur, others are known only to the calendar year in which they occurred
(with extra information for same-year events coming from the fact that they must be before
the survey date), while still others can only be dated as occurring sometime between waves
of survey data. To deal with this, we assume a uniform distribution of the logically possible
interval of time in which an event could have occurred given the data. We time-aggregate the
equations for the continuous-time data generating process to obtain a nonlinear estimating
equation. These equations posit that an event will have a permanent effect on happiness
(which we interpret as a permanent change in baseline mood) and a transitory effect on
happiness (which we interpret as the dynamics of elation). The key identifying assumption
is that there are no important transitory movements in baseline mood after an event.
For instance, events that are dated only to the year are estimated by the following
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equation.












where y is the year happiness is measured, y0 is the year an event occurred, and m is the
interview month in which happiness is measured. For events that are dated only to the wave,




] + εit, (3.8)
where tw1 is the time of the interview directly after an event occurred and tw0 is the time of
the interview directly before.
3.2.6 Recall bias
With some life events, respondents might suffer from imprecise recollection of the event’s
date. A reasonable assumption is that this recall bias is an increasing function of the time
since event occurrence. Given this assumption, a simple correction consists of multiplying
βT by the term e
γ(tr−t0), which (for negative values of γ) is a decreasing function of the
time elapsed between event and first recall. This correction yields the adjusted estimating
equation:
Hit = αi + YitβY + χi1(t >= t0)[βP + βT e
−δ(t−t0)eγ(tr−t0)] + εit, (3.9)
where tr is the time the event is first recalled.
3.3 Data
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which conducts a biennial
representative survey of Americans over the age of 50. The resulting panel data spanning the
years 1992 through 2010 includes detailed happiness reports and information on a rich set
of important life events. Although there are important panel data sets for subjective well-
63
being for other countries (most notably the German Socioeconomic Panel and the British
Household Panel Study), for the U.S., the HRS is the only survey with a long panel of
repeated observations on subjective well-being. In addition to the core HRS waves, we
use the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD), the Children of the
Depression Age (CODA), and the War Babies cohorts4. For some of the variables, we use
a version of this data provided by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging that includes
some additional imputations.
Each wave of the HRS asks respondents the following questions: “Now think about the
past week and the feelings you have experienced. Please tell me if each of the following
was true for you much of the time this past week: a) You felt you were happy b) You felt
sad c) You enjoyed life d) You felt depressed.” We treat the binary variables “happy” and
“enjoylife” based on these data, along with the reverse-coded “notsad” and “notdepressed”
as four indicators of the underlying latent value of happiness at the time of the interview.
Thus, we treat the probability of answering in the positive direction for each of these variables
as an increasing function of latent happiness.
HRS respondents are questioned about many health and other important life events in
each wave of the survey. Some of these events are precisely dated to the month but some
are only known to have occurred at some point between waves. Examples of the latter
include episodes of incontinence, congestive heart failure, hip fractures, cataract surgery,
births of grandchildren, and changes in social isolation. Widowing, heart attacks, strokes,
cancer, retirement, unemployment, and entry into nursing homes are dated to the precise
month. The Psychosocial Leave-Behind (PLB) component of the HRS provides retrospective
information on a number of other events with dating only to the year: death of a child,
natural disaster, combat, drug and alcohol addiction of family members, physical assault,
serious illness, serious illness of a family member, labor and financial market discrimination,
4The AHEAD cohort was initially part of a distinct study and includes respondents born before 1924.
CODA and the War Babies cohorts were added in 1998 and includes respondents born 1924-1930, and
1942-1947, respectively.
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police discrimination, firing, job search, changes in neighborhood safety, robbery, and others.
A measure of household income is available for all waves, which we include as a control
throughout. The HRS includes life insurance status, allowing us to partition the hedonic
response to widowing. Interestingly, there are also questions about life expectancy for many
of the respondents. We use these to construct a measure of subjective life expectancy, then
decompose the temporary response to an event into a component related to changes in
subjective life expectancy and a residual, which becomes the standard βT coefficient.
The subjective life expectancy (SLE) measure is constructed in the following way. For
certain waves, respondents are asked what probability they assign to their living to a particu-
lar age, where said age depends on the current age of the respondent. We linearly interpolate
the survival probability for all future years, then calculate SLE as the expectation of years
remaining.
3.4 Results
Because the HRS is a panel, we are able to conduct fixed effects estimation. Without
individual fixed effects, any heterogeneity in baseline happiness would bias estimation of the
temporary effect and the decay rate.
In preliminary work, we compared multiple approaches to the use of HRS subjective well-
being variables. As discussed in Section 3.3, the HRS provides four closely-related variables
pertaining to a respondent’s mood at the time of interview. Our preferred approach uses the
sum of the (appropriately-coded) variables as the dependent variable in all our specifications.
We obtained broadly similar results when conducting probit estimation with individual SWB
variables.
Table 3.1 gives estimates for βP , βT , and δ using our dynamic method for events dated
to the month (widowing, heart attack, stroke, cancer, unemployment, nursing home entry,
and retirement). Standard errors are all heteroskedasticity-robust.
Cancer, heart attacks, and strokes all follow a somewhat different pattern. We estimate a
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significant negative permanent effect in all three cases, with somewhat larger temporary than
permanent effects. Interestingly, strokes have both the largest permanent effect, relative to
temporary, as well as the slowest decay of the temporary setback. The temporary effect of
cancer is about one-third as large as the temporary effect of widowing for those without life
insurance. A relatively small but statistically significant negative permanent effect is found
with cancer as with the other two major health events, heart attacks and strokes. Strokes
induce roughly double the permanent effect found for heart attacks and cancer, which is
plausibly consistent with the enduring disability often suffered by stroke victims.
Regressions concerning the other events for which we have precise timing information
- unemployment, nursing home entry, and retirement - yield reasonable estimates. Unem-
ployment has a negative temporary effect in line with the magnitude of the aforementioned
health problems, but no significant permanent effect. Entry into a nursing home produces a
similar temporary effect, but also a large negative permanent reduction in SWB. Retirement
produces almost no SWB effect. Both nursing home entry and retirement are perhaps less
plausibly exogenous than the other events, and it may be that correlated factors are driving
the estimates.
The estimated depreciation rates are themselves of interest. For all the precisely-dated
events, with the exception of widowing (without life insurance), heart attacks, and cancer,
estimated depreciation rates are such that the half-life of an event is between about 9 and
13 months. That is, half of the temporary shock associated with an event has disappeared
after this time. Widowing (without life insurance) has a half-life of 5 months, while heart
attacks and cancer have half-lives of 4 and 3 months, respectively.
Figure 3.2a-3.2e illustrates all of this graphically, showing the predicted values of both a
non-parametric regression and an “impulse response” corresponding to our baseline specifi-
cation for events dated to the month. The impulse responses are constructed by assuming
the estimated βT , βP , δ and applying them to population means of all variables. In other
words,
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Ĥt = Hb + χi1(t >= 0)[βP + βT e
−δ(t)], (3.10)
where Hb is the mean pre-event SWB level and Ĥt is the predicted SWB value. This yields a
graphical representation of the temporary and permanent effects at work in the regressions.
Widowing is of particular interest, as widows experience an unusually large reduction in
SWB, all of which appears to be temporary. Individuals with life insurance suffer roughly
half as large a drop in SWB when compared to those without insurance, though the latter
are estimated to recover more quickly from their (larger) fall. This is depicted, both para-
metrically and non-parametrically, in Figure 3.3. In both cases, we identify a very large
effect that is almost entirely temporary.
Table 3.2 compares results from equation 3.5 and our dynamic method. The first three
columns show estimates (identical to Table 3.1) for βT, βP, and δ, respectively. The fourth,
fifth, and sixth columns give the cumulative temporary, permanent, and total effects, whose
construction was described previously. The mortality rate d is estimated off of the uncondi-
tional mean mortality rate in our sample and is approximately 0.02, while the interest rate
assumed is 0.05.
The “Lost Area” columns, 4, 5, and 6 (so-called because they show the “area under
the curve” associated with the hedonic response to an event), condense the information
provided in the baseline specification, giving measures of cumulative SWB consequences.
High depreciation rates render the cumulative temporary effects of heart attacks and stroke
relatively small in magnitude, while magnifying the permanent effects by comparison. Total
SWB loss is substantially larger for all health events than it is for widowing, largely because
of small but enduring permanent positive effects estimated for widowing.
We also implement equation 3.5, the linear regression described in Section 3.1.2. The
final column displays β1 from that regression. These results are generally signed consistently
with the Total Lost Area quantities, but relative magnitudes differ. Recall that 1 is an
indicator that toggles on permanently after an event. β1 registers larger magnitude effects
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for widowing than for health events, with the most negative result coming from nursing home
entry at −7.5.
Table 3.3 presents results that utilize data on subjective life expectancy for the same
life events. This is an example of the flexibility of our approach, which facilitates any
decomposition of SWB effects permitted by the data. The first four columns provide the usual
parameter estimates plus η, the effect of a one-year increase in subjective life expectancy
on the temporary hedonic effect. The final three columns give estimates from the previous
specification for comparison.
In all cases where we find a statistically significant result, the effect of η is as expected: an
event that increases life expectancy will increase SWB through this channel. The magnitude
of these life expectancy effects is small, however, and the available data on life expectancy
are crude.
Table 3.4 gives estimates of βP , βT , and δ for events that are dated relatively imprecisely:
either to the year or to the wave. In the former case, these are retrospective data from the
Psychosocial Leave-Behind survey. Because these estimates are based on retrospective data,
there are sometimes long gaps between event occurrence and recollection. For this reason,
we implement the recall-bias adjustment described previously. The data available for these
events is often quite poor, which is reflected in the occasional inability of the NLS procedure
to identify a δ significantly above zero. In these cases, the data does not permit the separation
of temporary and permanent SWB effects, and consequently βT and βP values should likely
be disregarded.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In Section 3.2.2, conditions were described that may produce discrepancies in the SWB
ranking (i.e., the ordering by magnitude of the “Total” cumulative effect) based on our
baseline specification, and on a regression that does not incorporate SWB mean reversion.
Table 3.2 suggests some concrete examples. Interestingly, within the three major health
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events we consider (heart attacks, strokes, and cancer), our cumulative SWB ranking mirrors
the ranking generated by equation 3.5. However, when comparing widowing with any of the
major health events, we see a different pattern. Using our approach, the health events all
have larger cumulative SWB consequences than widowing, though significantly smaller initial
(temporary) effects. Regression 3.5, on the other hand, yields the opposite result: widowing,
with or without life insurance, has an effect of greater magnitude.
This illustrates that the temporary/permanent decomposition of SWB data is sometimes
a first-order concern. The overall utility consequence of an event, good, or experience is
quite sensitive to this decomposition, since temporary effects are generally fairly quick to
decay. Without arbitrarily-frequent and indefinitely-extended panels of SWB measurements,
a regression specification that is not sensitive to hedonic dynamics will typically generate
errors, particularly when comparing events of dissimilar dynamic profiles. If one of the aims
of happiness economics is to inform public policy about relative valuations of events and
non-market goods, insensitivity to dynamic effects will compromise that project.
The approach presented here will be useful in a variety of ways. Work that aims at pricing
non-market goods, many of which take on characteristics of durable goods and produce a
changing flow of utility, will benefit from the explicit treatment of dynamic effects. When
data is infrequently-collected, retrospective, or otherwise limited, our approach will facilitate
the extraction of usable information. Since SWB variables have only recently been added to
some datasets, the ability to handle retrospective data is likely to be useful.
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Table 3.1: Baseline results
Parameter Estimates
N
Widowing (w/ insurance) -21.96*** 1.533** 0.763*** 3042
(2.552) (0.648) (0.158)
Widowing (w/o insurance) -40.41*** 1.319 1.657*** 1417
(6.223) (1.007) (0.408)
Cancer -7.242*** -1.302*** 2.598*** 23205
(1.335) (0.327) (0.802)
Heart attack -5.154*** -1.178*** 2.059* 13168
(1.526) (0.426) (1.060)
Stroke -3.374*** -2.296*** 0.888 13304
(1.120) (0.556) (0.583)
Unemployment -6.304*** 0.861* 0.631*** 12232
(0.911) (0.508) (0.194)
Entered nursing home -7.525*** -4.665*** 0.876* 8871
(1.818) (1.189) (0.477)
Retired -0.602 0.559*** 0.787 79359
(0.512) (0.179) (1.094)
3. Standard errors are in parentheses.





1. Dependent variable is the (0-100) index of happiness equal to 25*(sum of 
the 4 indicators of recent mood). See the text for a description of the 
indicators.
2. δ are annual rates of recovery.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of event study results with pooled results
Parameter Estimates Lost Area 
Temp Perm Total
Widowing (w/ insurance) -21.96*** 1.533** 0.763*** -26.37*** 22.06* -4.303 -3.515***
(2.552) (0.648) (0.158) (3.245) (11.77) (1.004)
Widowing (w/o insurance) -40.41*** 1.319 1.657*** -23.40*** 18.99 -4.415 -4.943***
(6.223) (1.007) (0.408) (4.043) (17.06) (1.758)
Cancer -7.242*** -1.302*** 2.598*** -2.715*** -18.73*** -21.45 -2.045***
(1.335) (0.327) (0.802) (0.501) (4.699) (0.317)
Heart attack -5.154*** -1.178*** 2.059* -2.421*** -16.95*** -19.37 -1.850***
(1.526) (0.426) (1.060) (0.714) (6.153) (0.411)
Stroke -3.374*** -2.296*** 0.888 -3.524*** -33.04*** -36.57 -3.416***
(1.120) (0.556) (0.583) (1.174) (7.946) (0.448)
Unemployment -6.304*** 0.861* 0.631*** -8.997*** 12.39* 3.395 -1.763***
(0.911) (0.508) (0.194) (1.305) (7.378) (0.507)
Entered nursing home -7.525*** -4.665*** 0.876* -7.962*** -67.15*** -75.11 -7.529***
(1.818) (1.189) (0.477) (1.921) (17.24) (0.756)
Retired -0.602 0.559*** 0.787 -0.703 8.040 7.337 1.145***
(0.512) (0.179) (1.094) (0.626) (9.201) (0.192)
3. Standard errors are in parentheses.






1. Dependent variable is the (0-100) index of happiness equal to 25*(sum of the 4 indicators of recent 
mood). See the text for a description of the indicators.
2. δ are annual rates of recovery.
5. Pooled coefficients are from a fixed effects regression of happiness on log household income and an 
indicator for whether the event has ever occurred previous to or in the current wave.
6. Area measures are based on an interest rate of .05 and a constant mortality rate of .019, the latter of 
which is the unconditional annual death rate in the entire sample
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Table 3.3: Results with and without subjective life expectancy
With Life Expectancy W/o Life Expectancy
Widowing (w/ insurance) -22.47*** 1.892 0.700*** -0.0594 -21.96*** 1.533** 0.763***
(4.086) (1.359) (0.243) (0.0771) (2.552) (0.648) (0.158)
Widowing (w/o insurance) -39.51*** 0.950 2.435** 0.136** -40.41*** 1.319 1.657***
(10.89) (1.875) (1.137) (0.0599) (6.223) (1.007) (0.408)
Cancer -7.096*** -0.440 1.955*** -0.0143 -7.242*** -1.302*** 2.598***
(1.576) (0.417) (0.755) (0.0238) (1.335) (0.327) (0.802)
Heart attack -8.089*** -0.623 2.744** 0.103** -5.154*** -1.178*** 2.059*
(2.645) (0.591) (1.370) (0.0487) (1.526) (0.426) (1.060)
Stroke -5.300*** -2.027** 0.798* 0.0556* -3.374*** -2.296*** 0.888
(1.826) (0.970) (0.485) (0.0308) (1.120) (0.556) (0.583)
Unemployment -10.05*** 1.696* 0.645*** 0.0977*** -6.304*** 0.861* 0.631***
(1.549) (0.967) (0.211) (0.0291) (0.911) (0.508) (0.194)
Entered nursing home -8.663** -5.079** 0.759 0.361* -7.525*** -4.665*** 0.876*
(3.911) (2.539) (0.611) (0.192) (1.818) (1.189) (0.477)
Retired -5.260 6.191* 0.0204 0.0123*** -0.602 0.559*** 0.787
(3.693) (3.655) (0.0155) (0.00373) (0.512) (0.179) (1.094)
3. Standard errors are in parentheses.
4. Events are all dated to the month.
b
T
bP δ η bT bP δ
1. Dependent variable is the (0-100) index of happiness equal to 25*(sum of the 4 indicators of recent mood). 
See the text for a description of the indicators.
2. δ are annual rates of recovery.
5. η are the effect of an additional year of subjective life expectancy.
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Table 3.4: Baseline results with imprecisely-dated events
Parameter Estimates
Events dated to the year
Death of child -6.003*** 0.387 0.960***
(1.938) (0.558) (0.256)
Family Illness -10.42*** 2.889*** 0.186***
(1.262) (0.770) (0.0453)






Fired (in last 5 years) -4.929 4.639 0.106
(6.254) (6.122) (0.101)








Robbed (in last 5 years) -0 -0.977 38.50
(0) (1.184) (115.1)
Serious physical assault -15.04*** 3.494 0.0691**
(3.481) (2.472) (0.0327)
Unfair dismissal -7.115*** 1.336* 0.287**
(1.717) (0.713) (0.121)
Unfairly denied loan -22.16** 21.27*** 0.00204
(8.723) (8.153) (0.00412)
Unfairly denied promotion -4.277 -0.321 2.023
(9.789) (0.849) (5.435)






Family member unemployed 
more than 3 months (in last 5 
years)
Fire, flood, earthquake, or other 
disaster
Moved to worse nbhd (in last 5 
years)
Respondent unemployed more 
than 3 months (in last 5 years)
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Baseline results with imprecisely-dated events
Unfairly treated by police -5.42e-06 1.919 7.867
(1.97e-05) (1.197) (6.871)
Combat experience 258.3 -243.4 0.000550
(272.2) (272.0) (0.000652)
Events dated to the wave
Cataract surgery 0.00156 25.75 -0.00831
(0.00273) (18.91) (0.00559)
Child moved within 10 miles -0.347** 32.16 0.00393
(0.136) (203.1) (0.0248)
Congestive heart failure -0.0154 352.2 0.000801
(0.0279) (491.1) (0.00108)
Hip fracture -10.58** 74.13 0.00625
(5.066) (78.30) (0.00659)
Incontinence -2.289*** 0.860* 0.597*
(0.515) (0.488) (0.317)
New grandchild -0.134* 1061 4.64e-05
(0.0762) (2117) (9.28e-05)
3. Standard errors are in parentheses.
1. Dependent variable is the (0-100) index of happiness equal to 
25*(sum of the 4 indicators of recent mood). See the text for a 
description of the indicators.








































Impulse Response of Happiness










Impulse Response of Happiness
(e) Unemployment



















(b) Without life insurance
Figure 3.3: Widowing with and without life insurance
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CHAPTER IV
Taxation, Match Quality and Social Welfare
4.1 Introduction
The relationship between taxation and social welfare is of central importance to public
finance and the accurate appraisal of public policy. In a sufficiently simple model, the
behavioral employment response to a tax entirely determines deadweight loss (DWL), and the
labor suppy elasticity is sufficient for its calculation. However, as argued in Feldstein (1999),
behavioral responses alone do not incorporate some important channels by which taxes reduce
social welfare. The taxable income elasticity, rather, reflects information concerning tax
evasion, shifts to deductible and tax-excluded consumption, and so forth, all of which affect
deadweight loss. Recent literature has developed around the proposition that taxable income
elasticities can generally serve as a sufficient statistic for the deadweight loss from taxation,
assuming (as described in Chetty, 2008) the absence of fiscal and classical externalities as
well as costless transfers between agents. In addition, Nunn (2012) suggests that social
welfare inference from any observed elasticity is incorrect if quantitatively-significant job
amenities are ignored by the econometrician. Nunn estimates a labor search model with
exogenously-endowed match-specific amenities, shows that that non-wage amenities are an
important component of worker compensation, and demonstrates that their existence induces
the over-estimation of DWL from taxation.
The aim of the present paper is to develop a complementary and broader exploration of
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match amenities and their connection to social welfare. In particular, our focus is on the
impact of the endogenous supply of amenities.
First, we take a step back and focus on the role of amenities in the absence of search
frictions. We consider an economy in which match quality is fixed, but amenity provision
is flexible and subject to convex production costs. Workers also choose hours, which are
multiplied by match quality to yield the total surplus from a match. Within this context,
adjustment to taxation occurs immediately, and deadweight loss is generated by inefficiently-
high amenity consumption and a low supply of work hours. Interestingly, we find that,
even in this static case, the introduction of amenities causes taxable income elasticities to
overestimate the deadweight loss from taxation.
We then move on to considering an environment with search frictions, which allows for
empirical estimation. The introduction of search frictions enables the coexistence of matches
of varying quality and amenity productivity, as well as the opportunity for workers to move
between these. We retain the assumption of fixed match-specific job quality and convex
amenity production costs. As in Nunn (2012), we estimate the model with duration data
from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), and compute steady state
equilibria for various tax rates. The flexible-amenity model implies a more severe overes-
timation of the deadweight loss from taxation when amenities are mistakenly ignored. As
such, the problem of reliance on taxable income elasticities as a proxy for the welfare effects
of taxation is exacerbated. In addition, we examine the dynamic effect of a change in taxes.
The amenity production function allows for both instantaneous and drawn-out responses
to changes in market conditions, since firms can adjust amenity supply immediately, and
workers can slowly move to matches with more efficient amenity production. Given this,
we show that taxable income elasticities over-estimate deadweight loss by an even greater
amount as they become more long-run in scope.
Three seminal papers make it possible to conduct our structural analysis: Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) (job search), Jovanovic (1979) (job duration as match quality), and Shimer
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(2006) (on-the-job search). Mortensen and Pissarides provide the basic framework for the
random search model employed in this paper, albeit without on-the-job search and a few
other modifications. Working within the Mortensen and Pissarides class of model, Shimer
(2006) adds on-the-job search in a partial equilibrium context, with job offers arriving at an
exogenous rate constrained to be the same on and off the job.
By embedding match quality variation in an equilibrium model of job turnover, Jovanovic
(1979) and related papers like McCall (1990) provide a theoretical basis for an assertion we
adhere to, which is that tenure is informative about job match quality. Indeed, a large,
mostly empirical literature has developed that takes tenure as a proxy for match quality and
examines, for example, job mismatch over the business cycle (Bowlus, 1995, Kahn, 2008)
and the effects of changes in unemployment insurance law (Ours and Vodopivec, 2008).
Some authors have pursued related questions with identification or calibration strategies
making use of duration data. Nagypal (2007), for instance, distinguishes accumulation of
human capital from learning about match quality using, in part, matched firm-worker data
including tenure information. Becker (2009) focuses on job amenities and finds that they are
quantitatively substantial.
Sullivan and To (2011) assess the relative importance of wage and non-wage job utility.
They estimate the offer distributions of wages and non-wage utility in a search context, and
use the fraction of job switches associated with wage declines to identify the distribution of
non-wage utility. Although they are not concerned with estimating the distribution of match
quality, like Becker, Sullivan and To find non-wage utility to be substantial.
Though the paper is not explicitly about compensating differentials, separate estimation
of productivity and amenities, along with the particular wage bargain assumed, implicitly
involve tradeoffs between wages and amenities. As is intuitively the case, workers in jobs with
low amenities will (holding match quality constant) receive higher wages. Our framework
makes use of wages to help separate productivity and amenities, which puts it in debt of
papers like Rosen (1974) and Friedman and Kuznets (1954). Unlike most compensating
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differentials papers, however, the present paper does not assume equality of utility across
options and the focus is on parameters of the aggregate match quality distributions rather
than cross-sectional tradeoffs.
On-the-job search models typically predict that all job changes will be associated with
increases in observed wages. However, this is decidedly not the case in the data1, and
various solutions have been proposed. Of course, some or all of wage declines associated
with jot-to-job transitions can be interpreted as measurement error. In the NLSY79, for
instance, that some reported wage declines are spurious is explicitly noted by the survey
administrators.2 Wolpin (1987) and related literature explicitly incorporate measurement
error into their models. It is difficult to explain the extent of job-to-job transitions that
involve wage declines with measurement error alone, considering, for instance, that a full
third of job-to-job wage changes in the NLSY79 are reductions. Another approach is to
construct some aspect of the model that leads workers to (occasionally) optimally switch to
lower-wage jobs. As an example, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) use
a bargaining arrangement that allows workers to choose lower-wage but higher-productivity
firms that will in the future be able to better match outside offers. The present paper,
though not principally motivated by the concern of wage reductions in job-to-job transitions,
provides a different answer to this question. When unpriced amenities are accounted for,
optimal wage choice is such that workers will frequently choose lower-wage jobs that are
nonetheless preferred to previous jobs due to their superior amenities.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents our analysis pertaining to the static
economy, and Section 4.3 develops the model with search frictions. Section 4.4 presents
details on the data we use for estimation, Section 4.5 presents results, and Section 4.6
concludes.
1See Sullivan and To (2011) for data from the NLSY97. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) find a similar
result in French data, with a third to a half of workers reporting wage decreases as they change jobs.
2From NLSY79 documentation at http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/wages.htm:
“Note that: the calculation procedure, which factors in each respondent’s usual wage, time unit of pay, and
usual hours worked per day/per week produces, at times, extremely low and extremely high pay rate values;
no editing of values reported by a respondent occurs even if the value is extreme, such as $25,000 per hour...”
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4.2 Static economy with amenities
As shown in Feldstein (1999), under conditions outlined in that paper, the deadweight
loss from taxation can be stated as a function of the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to the net of tax rate ε. In particular, DWL is shown to be proportionally increasing in ε.
Thus, knowledge of ε along with the proportionality parameter and any applicable intercept
parameter is sufficient to infer DWL. In this section, we show that even in a static context
(i.e., in the absence of search) when variables that matter for utility are not accounted for,
DWL can be overestimated when relying on the aforementioned methodology.
Consider an economy inhabited by a representative worker and a profit-maximizing firm.
Individuals’ utility is an increasing function of after-tax consumption, the fraction of time
spent on leisure ` ∈ (0, 1), and on-the-job amenity q. Firms maximize
π (1− `)−W (1 + τ)− φ (q) ,
where π (1− `) is the worker’s monetary productivity, W is the after-tax real wage, and φ (q)
is the cost of producing the amenity level q. Equilibrium {W, `, q} can be interpreted as the
result of workers making firms take-it-or leave offers, or firms posting offers that workers
choose, therefore inducing a zero-profit condition.
We focus on a worker’s problem (the solution of which reveals equilibrium {W, q, `})
being the maximization of utility consistent with providing a firm at least zero profit:
max
W,q,`
u (W + T, `, q) such that π (1− `) ≥ W (1 + τ) + φ (q) .
All tax revenues are returned by the government to workers in transfers denoted T ; T is
not perceived by workers as being related to tax payments. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the worker’s problem. DWL is−du/dτ , and ε = d ln ((1 + τ)W ) /d ln (1− τ).





u (W + T, `) such that π (1− `) ≥ W (1 + τ) .
By making use of a simple utility and amenity production cost function, Proposition
1, which follows below, serves to illustrate that overestimation of DWL by use of taxable
income elasticities is not necessarily an artifact of the search process itself. Intuitively,
this occurs because omitting from consideration an untaxed choice variable that enters the
utility function and over which individuals can adjust is equivalent to omitting a margin of
adjustment that allows mitigation of the utility impact of taxation.
Proposition 1. Suppose u = α log (W + T ) + β log ` + γ log q and φ = (1/A) exp (q),
where A is a scaling constant. Then,
1. DWL can be stated as
a (W, `, q, ·) + c (W, `, q, ·) dT/dτ + b (W, `, q, ·) (1− τ)−1 εY , (4.1)
where Y is taxable income.
2. If all parameters and variables that enter equation (4.1) are observed, but utility is
incorrectly assumed to be given by the sum of α log (W + T ) and β log (`), then, for
T > 0 and dT/dτ ≥ 0, DWL is overestimated.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary. If all parameters and variables that enter equation (4.1) are observed and
the amenity is not a choice variable, then even if utility is incorrectly assumed to be given by
the sum of α log (W + T ) and β log (`) , equation (4.1) yields the correct value for DWL.
For simplicity, utility in search models is often assumed to be linear; this is something we
assume ourselves later in the paper. Proposition 2 shows that the implications of Proposition
1 can also carry over to situations in which utility is linear.
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Proposition 2. Suppose u = (W + T ) + ` + q, φ = (1/A) exp (q), and ` is inelastic at
some level ¯̀. Proposition 1 and its corollary hold, mutatis mutandis.
Proposition 3. The implications from Propositions 1 and 2 go through if instead the
linear cost function φ = q is assumed.
As developed above, our framework differs from that of Feldstein (1999) primarily by
allowing for the possibility of a convex amenity cost function instead of an implicitly constant
returns one. This, on its own, leads to changes in the price of leisure relative to the amenity
after a tax is introduced, which makes the relationship between DWL and taxable income
more complicated. Note that given convex costs, in the static case the amenity’s relative
price is increasing after a tax, whereas in the search setting the effective price may actually
decline as workers find jobs with more readily available amenities.3
4.3 Model
The model builds on those developed in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer
(2006). We account for on-the-job search, match quality heterogeneity, endogenous job de-
struction stemming from both job-to-job transitions and changes in the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity of a match, and job switching costs. Search frictions are such that workers and firms
meet each other only occasionally. Matches produce a flow surplus that depends on idiosyn-
cratic (time-varying) productivity x, a time-invariant match-specific monetary productivity
π, and an amenity q that is produced endogenously by firms. The production function for
q is q(k) = log(A · k), where k is the capital input and A is the match-specific productivity
of amenity supply. A is distributed lognormally with σ = σA and µ = 0. Because matching
3As shown in the appendix, if all parameters and variables that enter equation (4.1) are observed, but
utility is incorrectly assumed to be given by the sum of α log (w + T ) and β log (`), then, for T > 0 and
dT/dτ ≥ 0, DWL is also overestimated under the assumption of a linear cost function φ = q. Also shown in
the appendix is that, assuming that all parameters and variables that enter equation are (4.1) observed, but
the cost of the amenity is incorrectly assumed to be q when in fact it is (1/A) exp (q), then use of equation
(4.1) leads DWL to be underestimated; if the reverse occurs, then DWL is overestimated. Results applicable
to the linear case are case specific as they can involve corner solutions; relevant details can be found in the
appendix.
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opportunities are scarce, surplus is generated by successful matches, and wages are set by
bargaining over this surplus. A worker’s values of being unemployed or employed, as well
as firms’ value of employment, are represented as Bellman equations. Since the resulting
functions are both monotonic and discounted, these equations are contraction mappings.4
The model is not solvable analytically, so we solve it via value function iteration on
a discrete grid and simulate it in discrete-time, calibrated to a monthly frequency5. The
timing of the model is as follows. A period begins with any particular worker being either
unemployed or employed. If employed, a worker-firm match is characterized by both a
constant match productivity π and a constant amenity production parameter A6. These are
drawn simultaneously when a prospective match forms, and do not change over the course
of a match; additional details about draws of π, x, and A and consequent q production
will be provided throughout the rest of this section. Then, a time-varying idiosyncratic
productivity shock x is drawn; this occurs every period. Employed individuals receive a
wage and unemployed individuals receive exogenous unemployment flow benefits. Next, an
exogenous separation shock s may occur. If it does, unemployment results and the worker
does not receive an employment offer until at least the subsequent period. If a separation
does not occur, or if the worker was already unemployed, then a job-finding shock may occur.
Firms and workers meet each other with a probability that depends only on the worker’s
employment status: α0 for an unemployed worker and α1 for an employed worker. The
idiosyncratic productivity draw x occurs simultaneously with the match shock α, allowing
workers to choose between unemployment and employment (the former being chosen if the
productivity draw is such that the value of unemployment is higher), switching to a new
job (occurring, for employed workers, if the surplus of the new match exceeds that of the
present match, in which case switching costs are paid immediately), and remaining in the
4Blackwell (1965) and Sargent (1987).
5Except under very particular assumptions (e.g., Shimer, 2003) that would make identification difficult
or impossible, on-the-job search and the switching cost make it impossible to find a closed-form solution to
the model.
6Though this paper is concerned with both the distribution of match quality draws and the actual
distribution of accepted draws, “match quality distribution” refers to the former, unless otherwise specified.
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old job (occurring if an individual is already employed and the continuation value of the
match exceeds that of all other alternatives). All job-finding shocks are characterized by a
match quality draw and a new idiosyncratic productivity draw on which wages (fully flexible
and instantly renegotiated) are based. Following this, the economy moves into the new
state and the period ends. Note that the switching cost is considered to be a sunk cost for
wage-setting purposes. This is consistent with the usual practice in most of the hiring cost
literature, which can be thought of as analogous to the switching cost considered here.
The model timing is depicted by the following graph:
wage or b earned s shock α and x shock worker takes action period ends
Idiosyncratic productivity draws are match-specific and time-varying, so it is possible for
workers to switch to lower match quality jobs with sufficiently high productivity draws. x is
drawn from a lognormal distribution with a persistence ρx, following the process log(x
′) =
ρx log(x) + εx, where εx ∼ N(0, σ2x).7
Firms and workers encounter one another with probabilities that depend only on em-
ployment status and are constant over time. Match quality m consists of two components: a
monetary productivity term π that accrues to the firm and a non-monetary benefits term q
that is entirely consumed by the worker. The amenity q is produced endogenously by firms
as described previously. π draws are distributed according to a normal cdf Π with mean zero
and standard deviation σπ. m is equal to the sum of π and q and obeys a normal cdf M




q . All of these quantities are drawn
simultaneously when a firm meets a worker. π and A (the amenity production parameter)
remain constant for the duration of a match. A one-time switching cost c is incurred by
employed workers who accept new job offers.
7The x grid and discrete transition matrix are formed according to the Tauchen (1986) procedure.
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Denote a worker’s value of employment by W , and her value of unemployment by U .
Employed individuals receive as compensation the amenity level q, and also the pre-tax wage
w (to which a linear tax rate τ is applied). All economic agents discount the future at rate β.
With probability s, the match is destroyed and the worker is forced into unemployment. With
probability α1, the worker encounters an outside job opportunity. Thus, with probability
(1− s)α1, an employed individual must decide whether to switch jobs (taking account of
instantaneous job-changing costs c, which are time invariant and exogenous), remain in her
current job, or transition into unemployment (voluntarily, if the value of doing so is greater
than that of the alternatives). Similarly, with the product of the probabilities (1− s) and
(1− α1), the worker must decide between remaining in her current job, or transitioning into
unemployment. Therefore,
W (π, q, x) = (1− τ)w(π, q, x) + q + βsU + β(1− s)(1− α1)Prob((U > W (π, q, x′))|x) · U︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad x shock: separate
+ β(1− s)(1− α1)E[1(W (π, q, x′) ≥ U) ·W (π, q, x′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
no job offer: stay in job
+ β(1− s)α1E[max{W (π′, q′, x′nj)− c,W (π, q, x′), U}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation value conditional on new job offer
,
where an apostrophe denotes the value of a variable in the following period, and therefore x′nj
is the idiosyncratic shock associated with a new job offer. Following similar considerations,
U = b+ β(1− α0)U + βα0E[W (π′, q′, x′), U ],
where b is the constant net unemployment flow benefit and α0 is the probability an unem-
ployed individual meets a firm. As noted above, not all meetings between firms and workers
lead to a match being formed. This allows, for instance, a distinction to be made between a
worker’s probability of receiving a job offer and the probability of a transition from unem-
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ployment to employment. In the absence of this distinction, endogeneity in the acceptance of
offers would potentially bias estimation of the match quality offer distribution, as discussed
previously.
Since job separations due to bad idiosyncratic draws are bilateral in the sense that an
employer sees it fit to end a match under the same circumstances as the worker, the firm’s
value of a job, J , can largely be written in terms of worker value functions.
J(π, q, x) =x+ π − w(π, q, x)− φ(q) + β(1− s)(1− α1)E[1(W (π, q, x′) ≥ U) · J(π, q, x′)]
+ β(1− s)α1E[1((W (π′, q′, x′nj)− c < W (π, q, x′)) ∩ (W (π, q, x′) ≥ U)) · J(π, q, x′)],
where φ is the cost function associated with amenity supply. Note that although we do not
model vacancies explicitly, following related literature, the firm’s value of a job reflects free
entry into vacancy creation, meaning that the value of a vacancy is zero.
The surplus from a match is given by
S (π, q, x) = W (π, q, x)− U + J (π, q, x) .
Workers and firms do not care about the particular composition of m = π+ q; therefore, W ,
J , and hence the surplus S can be though of as simply taking m rather than {π, q} as an
argument. Nash bargaining over the surplus implies that
γS (m,x) = W (m,x)− U (m,x) and (1− γ)S (m,x) = J (m,x) ,
where γ is the bargaining power of workers. The observed wage is a function of q. Through-
out, we solve for the symmetric Nash bargaining equilibrium γ = 0.5.
The model just described is similar to Nunn (2012), with the following important ex-
ception: amenities are now generated according to a production function, the efficiency of
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which is heterogenous across matches. The log specification, q(k) = log(A · k), is chosen for
computational simplicity; it is appropriately concave in capital input, and as will be shown
later, induces an optimal amenity level that is concave in A.
Amenity q is optimally chosen by firms to maximize the total surplus associated with a
match. Note that q∗ solves a subproblem separable from that solved by the Nash bargain.
First, q is set to make a worker indifferent between having another dollar of output devoted
to wage increase, and another dollar spent on the amenity, thereby maximizing both the
surplus in any given period and the total surplus of a match.8 Then, the worker and firm
split the total match surplus according to a Nash bargain, conditional on the particular q∗.
Another way to state this is as follows: when the amenity q is optimally chosen, with the
marginal cost of amenity production equal to the (reciprocal of the) marginal benefit of the
wage, an increase in the surplus fraction accruing to workers will simply increase the wage
paid.
As before, assume that the amenity cost function is φ(q) = 1
A
exp(q). Since q and the
wage are perfect substitutes in consumption, and φ′′(q) > 0, there is a constant, match-
specific optimal level of the amenity, q∗(A), chosen by firms (assuming for the moment that








→ q∗ = log(A).
Note that workers receive distinct draws of π and A. The latter draw implies a particular
optimally-chosen q, and the distributions of π and q conform to the distribution of m assumed
by the model. Though workers and firms are indifferent between drawing {πlow, qhigh} or
{πhigh, qlow}, where πlow + qhigh = πhigh + qlow, the two draws do generate distinct observed
8Without changes in tax rates, the amenity is optimally held constant during a match, with idiosyncratic
productivity variation reflected only in wage variation. This is due to the assumption of linear utility, which
substantially simplifies solution of the model by allowing q to be computed separately from the wage.
88
wages. The correlation between tenure and observed wage allows for separate identification
of the π and q distributions.
A crucial aspect of this analysis is the effect of wage taxation on amenity supply and
associated social welfare. Assume that w is the pre-tax wage. When a linear wage tax τ
is implemented, the first order condition and optimal amenity level are given below. The











→ q∗ = log(A)− log(1− τ)
4.4 Data
Data is taken from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The NLSY79 is a
nationally-representative panel of more than ten thousand individuals at inception in 1979,
with periodic successive surveys through the present. The detailed employment, demo-
graphic, and job spell data is necessary for this study, and the panel nature of the data
permits comparison of this paper’s results with those obtained from a more conventional
wage regression approach, which requires person and match fixed effects.
We drop the military and supplemental subsamples. We also drop currently-enrolled
high-school and college students from the sample. This leaves us with about 30,000 primary
job spells. Table 4.1 gives summary statistics for relevant unweighted NLSY79 variables.
Figure 4.1 shows the unweighted empirical tenure distribution.
Particularly notable is the fact that a surprising fraction of job-to-job wage changes are
negative; fully one third of such wage changes are decreases, though measurement error is
almost certainly exaggerating this figure. Due to concerns about measurement error, we
use only the middle 95 percentiles of the wage data, making the same adjustment in the
model’s simulations so that only the trimmed data is generated. This mitigates the effect of
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Figure 4.1: Unweighted empirical tenure distribution




















error-ridden outliers. Wages are adjusted by the CPI-U to 2010 dollars.
Data are weighted to yield a nationally-representative sample before use in the model.
We use the NLS79’s tenure variables corresponding to the primary jobs of respondents as well
as various demographic variables that allow construction of a conditional tenure distribution.
The tenure variables are constructed by the NLSY using worker-reported job start and stop
dates, and are connected across waves of the survey by means of employer identification
numbers. Demographic and other variables are dated to the end of each completed job spell.
In addition, We set the simulated panel length equal to the average time a worker is present
in the sample. This ensures that any truncation in the data (due to the requirement that
spells terminate before the sample ends) is matched by truncation of the simulated spells.
We do not use the weighted empirical moments directly. Certain observable variables -
age, education, etc. - explain some variation in job duration. Ex ante variation in worker
characteristics is not part of the baseline model, so we prefer to adjust the data to more
closely approximate the model’s assumption of ex ante identical agents. To construct the
90
empirical tenure variables, we first run the regression:
Tit = Xitβ + εit
where Tit is the tenure for a particular person’s completed job spell beginning in year t, Xit
is demographic information associated with a person in year t including age, education, sex,
and race. We experimented with different specifications of industry and occupation dummies,
but these made little difference to the results after the demographic variables were included.
The time-varying variables are taken at the end of a job spell. Since the structural model
is one of homogeneous agents who differ only ex post, we then construct tenure spells that
are purged of observable variation due to age and other variables. The new tenure variable
is given by T̂it = ε̂it +Xβ̂, where X is the vector of population means corresponding to the
demographic variables. Wages are adjusted in precisely the same way.
4.5 Results
The moments and parameters identified are similar to those used in Nunn (2012). Simu-
lated and empirical moments are presented in Table 4.2. The model does not closely match
two particular moments: the unemployment rate and the job-to-job transition probability.
At 0.069, the observed NLSY job-to-job transition probability is quite high: a multiple of the
monthly rate generally thought to obtain in the US labor market (see, for example, the 0.028
figure calculated using SIPP data by Nagypal, 2008). Our model predicts a substantially
smaller quantity than the NLSY79 figure. This is essentially due to the large inframarginal
rents implied by substantial match quality variation: many workers quickly move to matches
with high match quality and then receive comparatively few offers or productivity shocks
that induce them to quit for either another job or unemployment, respectively. It is perhaps
the case that a more flexible framework for match quality determination - amenity depre-
ciation, for example, or separate offer distributions for unemployed and employed workers -
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would more effectively match both the observed tenure moments and job-to-job transition
data.
4.5.1 Endogenous amenity supply
In this section, we compare deadweight loss results from Nunn (2012) with the current
analysis. The previous paper required amenities to be constant during a match and ex-
ogenously endowed at the moment a worker meets a firm. Amenities were therefore not
permitted to adjust in response to tax changes. The current paper relaxes this assumption
and allows for additional important margins of adjustment that may be relevant to the social
welfare and taxable income responses to tax changes.
Social welfare in a period is calculated as the sum of total flow surplus minus the cost of
amenities and switching costs
I∑
i
(1(employedit = 1) · (xit + πit + qit − φ(qit)))−
I∑
i
(1(jobswitchit = 1)) · c,
where 1(jobswitchit is an indicator for whether a particular worker moves from one match
to another in a given period.
Taxable income is the sum of pre-tax wages received in a particular period
I∑
i
(1(employedit = 1) · (wit)).
Both social welfare and taxable income are normalized to 100 in the absence of taxation.
Note that job switching costs are not considered to be tax-deductible. A substantial portion
of switching costs are non-monetary, and many workers in the data do not itemize their
deductions in any event.
The tables in the appendix give results under the two sets of assumptions. What is
notable is that the paths of social welfare and taxable income, as the tax rate increases, are
even more different in the case with endogenous amenity supply (as compared to the case
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with amenity endowment). For instance, between tax rates of 20% and 30%, the taxable
income and social welfare elasticities are 0.20 and 0.06, respectively, in the case of exogenous
amenity endowment. This is in contrast to the 0.39 and 0.08 elasticities for taxable income
and social welfare, respectively, in the endogenous amenity supply case. In this latter case,
taxable income falls very quickly as the tax rate rises, reflecting both the immediate ability
of firms to reallocate compensation into amenities and out of wages, and also the long-run
ability of workers to choose firms with higher amenity productivity A but lower monetary
productivity π. Results are given in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2. In the original case, shown in
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3, only the long-run movement to higher-amenity jobs was allowed
to occur.
Note that social welfare and taxable income elasticities are generally higher in the endoge-
nous amenity environment than in the exogenous environment. With endogenous amenities,
there is now an additional margin on which firms can adjust. More specifically, consider
the subset of workers in the exogenous amenity endowment case who are in good matches
that happen to be characterized by high productivity and low amenity. A sufficiently small
tax increase will not destroy these matches or induce these workers to quit for matches with
higher amenity levels. However, in the endogenous amenity economy, even a small tax in-
crease will immediately cause firms to offer higher amenity levels to everyone, including the
aforementioned workers. This allows for a sharper response to tax changes.
To the extent that firms can adjust their supply of amenities valued by workers, then, the
issue of deadweight loss over-estimation is more serious than in Nunn (2012). In Section 4.5.2,
we will disaggregate the short- and long-run mechanisms of labor adjustment to tax changes.
4.5.2 Dynamic analysis
Section 4.5.1 develops a model that allows both workers and firms to flexibly respond to
changes in economic conditions (namely, tax rates). Firms immediately adjust the mix of
wage and amenity compensation, while workers have the additional ability to search for new
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matches with preferable amenity productivity. A tax reduction, for instance, will instantly
cause a reduction in amenity supply. It will also induce workers to search for jobs with higher
overall match quality but lower amenity productivity now that compensation in the form of
wages is less penalized.
In a model with both immediate and frictional adjustment, it is now possible to exam-
ine the dynamics of the tax response. The differences between short- and long-run taxable
income elasticities have been the subject of much research (Saez et al., 2009). Saez and coau-
thors discuss the importance of having the long-run elasticity for the purpose of estimating
the total deadweight loss from an income tax, but recognize the substantial econometric
difficulties implicit in calculating long-run consequences. Short-run elasticities necessarily
do not reflect the costly labor market and tax adjustments that workers can make only over
a substantial period of time. On the other hand, short-run elasticities overstate the true
response to tax law changes when workers can shift income across time. 9 Chetty et al.
(2011) develop a model in which labor supply elasticities are measured differently depending
on whether the identification strategy incorporates worker search/adjustment costs. They
show that macro elasticities do not get at these costs, while micro elasticities do, causing
the macro estimates to be substantially larger.
The model presented in this paper allows for an examination of the tax response over
time. We conduct an experiment in which the tax rate is initially assumed to be 24.8%, then
unexpectedly increased by 10 percentage points10. As one would expect, taxable income
falls sharply just after the unexpected tax increase, reflecting the shift of compensation to
(costly) match amenities. Immediately after the tax increase, taxable falls by a bit more
than one percentage point. Taxable income then falls slowly as workers gradually find new
jobs with more efficient amenity supply, and associated lower wages.
9“...the tax reform of 1993 seems to have generated a temporary decline in top 1% incomes in 1993 and
a temporary spike in 1992 as tax filers tried to pull reported taxable income from 1993 into 1992 to take
advantage of the lower 1992 tax rate. As a result, the elasticity estimated using only the years 1992 and
1993 is large.” (p.28, Saez et al. (2009))
1024.8% is the 2010 ratio of tax revenues (at all levels of government) to gross domestic product as estimated
in the OECD Tax Revenue Statistics.
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Social welfare in the model also drops discontinuously in the aftermath of a new tax, as
indicated in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.5. These graphs depict social welfare and taxable income
just prior to and in the months after a 10 percentage point tax increase, with the pre-tax
change baseline normalized to 100.
It is convenient to think about this counterfactual in terms of a social planner’s problem.
Intuitively, the social planner would choose a lower level of amenity and higher wage than
workers and firms find it privately optimal to select in the aftermath of a tax increase, and this
is reflected in the initial social welfare drop. This is simply the usual logic of a social planner
preferring a muted behavioral response to taxation. Perhaps counter-intuitively, however,
social welfare actually rises slightly, after the initial sharp decline, as workers make their way
to matches with more efficient amenity production. While distorting in its own right, the
migration of workers to these new jobs appears to mitigate the distortion associated with
the initial sharp increase in amenity production. For this reason, taxable income elasticities
actually over-estimate deadweight loss more as they become more long-run in scope. Nunn
(2012) explains that the existence of unobserved amenities, in a search context, are already
sufficient to bias upwards estimates of deadweight loss from taxable income elasticities. The
current analysis indicates that this problem is compounded by a focus on long-run elasticities,
simply because these larger long-run taxable income elasticities indicate an excessively large
deadweight loss. However, work that does take amenities into account would ideally use
long-run elasticities, since short-run responses fail to account for endogenous changes in
amenity compensation.
4.6 Conclusion
The costly, endogenous supply of job amenities by firms has a number of interesting
implications for labor markets and public policy. In particular, results from the present
paper reinforce a conclusion from Nunn (2012): the public finance literature concerning
deadweight loss (DWL) estimation should take amenities into account. Work by Martin
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Feldstein and others has made the case for utilizing data on taxable income elasticities, rather
than labor supply elasticities, for the purpose of calculating social welfare consequences of
taxation. We show that it is necessary to estimate the heterogeneity and parameters of
amenity supply in order to correctly infer deadweight loss from taxation. Deadweight loss
is generally overestimated in work that omits explicit consideration of amenities, and this
overestimation is proportional to the quantitative significance of heterogeneity in amenities
across job matches. The endogenous supply of amenities, rather than exogenous endowment,
is shown to exacerbate this overestimation. Examination of a friction-less economy reveals
that this result is not necessarily an artifact of search. In addition, we argue that long-
run taxable income elasticities, while often considered by the public finance literature to be
preferable, can be even more misleading than short-run elasticities after taking into account
the possibility of gradual migration of workers into more amenity-focused job matches in
response to tax increases.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Curvature in Utility
Convex amenity cost function: φ = (1/A) exp (q). The Lagrangian is
L = α log (W + T ) + β log `+ γ log q + λ (π (1− `)−W (1 + τ)− φ (q)) ,
and the first-order conditions (FOCs) are
α
W + T
− λ (1 + τ) = 0 =⇒ α
W + T
= λ (1 + τ) =⇒ α










− λφ′ =⇒ γ
qφ
= λ, (4.4)
where the third FOC follows by the assumption that φ = (1/A) exp (q). Combining the first






















qφ = g, (4.6)
jointly implying that
x1`π = x2qφ = (W + T ) (1 + τ) = g. (4.7)
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Total differentiation of equation (4.5) implies

















while total differentiation of equation (4.6) implies
x2φdq + qx2φ

















where the second line follows from φ = 1
A
exp (q). Futhermore, note that
ε =
d log ((1 + τ)W )




























where Y = W (1 + τ) is taxable income.





























































































































































where the last line follows from definition of g in equation (4.7). Now, substitute in for dq/dτ

























(1 + q) g
+ γ
(1− τ)−1 εY
(1 + q) g
− γ 1 + τ




where the last line again follows from definition of g in equation (4.7). Finally, substitute in
























(1 + q) g
+ γ
(1− τ)−1 εY
(1 + q) g
− γ 1 + τ




where now the first line follows from definition of g in equation (4.7). Thus,
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DWL = a (W, `, q, ·) + c (W, `, q, ·) dT
dτ
+ b (W, `, q, ·) (1− τ)−1 εY . (4.16)
Of course, a (W, `, q, ·), b (W, `, q, ·), c (W, `, q, ·), Y , and ε are endogenous and jointly deter-
mined.
Suppose that all parameters and variables that enter the DWL equation are observed,
but utility is incorrectly assumed to be given by the sum of α log (W + T ) and β log (`). In
this case, the last line of DWL in equation (4.15) is not taken into account, and DWL is
therefore overestimated if and only if11
−γ T
(1 + q) g
+ γ
(1− τ)−1 εY
(1 + q) g
− γ 1 + τ




Using the definition of ε from equation (4.10), the previous holds if and only if
−γ T
(1 + q) g
+ γ
(1− τ)−1
(1 + q) g













− γ 1 + τ




⇐⇒ − (W + T )− (1 + τ) dW
dτ
− (1 + τ) dT
dτ
< 0. (4.17)
Now, note that total differentiation of the budget constraint yields
−πd` = (1 + τ) dW +Wdτ + φdq,
where the last term makes use of φ = 1
A














11It immediately follows from inspection of equation (4.15) that if the amenity is not a choice variable,
then the third line of this equation is absent. Thus if all parameters and variables that enter equation (4.1)
are observed and the amenity is not a choice variable, then even if utility is incorrectly assumed to be given
by the sum of α log (w + T ) and β log (`), equation (4.1) yields the correct value for DWL.
100





































=⇒ (1 + τ) dW
dτ
= −W − W + T
x1
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= −W−W + T
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−W (1 + q)x1x2 − (W + T ) (1 + q)x2 − (W + T )x1 − (1 + τ) ((1 + q)x2 + x1) dT/dτ
(1 + τ) ((1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + q)x2 + x1)
.
(4.19)
Substituting equation (4.19) into the inequality (4.17) therefore implies that the inequal-
ity holds if and only if
− (W + T ) + W (1 + q)x1x2 + (W + T ) (1 + q)x2 + (W + T )x1
(1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + q)x2 + x1
+
(1 + τ) ((1 + q)x2 + x1) dT/dτ
(1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + q)x2 + x1




that is, if and only if
− (W + T ) (1 + q)x1x2 − (W + T ) (1 + q)x2 − (W + T )x1
+W (1 + q)x1x2 + (W + T ) (1 + q)x2 + (W + T )x1
+ (1 + τ) ((1 + q)x2 + x1) dT/dτ − (1 + τ) ((1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + q)x2 + x1) < 0,
which is true if and only if




Of course, this is always true for T, dT/dτ > 0, in which cases DWL is indeed overestimated
by assuming away the existence of the amenity.
Linear amenity cost function: φ = q. Assume instead that the cost function is linear
so that the budget constraint satisfies
π (1− `) = W (1 + τ) + q,






















which jointly imply that
x1`π = x2q = (W + T ) (1 + τ) = g.
Using analogous procedures as detailed for the convex cost function case, it can then be
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−Wx1x2 − (W + T ) (x1 + x2)− (1 + τ) (x1 + x2) dT/dτ



































Suppose that all parameters and variables that enter the DWL equation are observed, but
utility is incorrectly assumed to be given by the sum of α log (W + T ) and β log (`). In this
case, the last line of the DWL is not taken into account, and DWL is therefore overestimated












Substituting in for ε and then for dW/dτ implies that the previous is true if and only if
− (W + T )− (1 + τ) dW
dτ
− (1 + τ) dT
dτ
< 0
⇐⇒ − (W + T )+Wx1x2 + (W + T ) (x1 + x2) + (1 + τ) (x1 + x2) dT/dτ
x1x2 + x1 + x2
−(1 + τ) dT
dτ
< 0
⇐⇒ − (W + T )x1x2 − (W + T ) (x1 + x2) +Wx1x2 + (W + T ) (x1 + x2)
+ (1 + τ) (x1 + x2)
dT
dτ




which holds if and only if




Again, this is true for T, dT/dτ > 0, in which cases DWL is indeed overestimated when
assuming away the existence of the amenity.
Over/under estimation in linear versus convex cost function scenarios. From
above, it is straightforward that if the cost function is convex but the amenity is assumed
away, then the DWL is overestimated by,
T (1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + τ) (1 + q)x1x2dT/dτ
(1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + q)x2 + x1
while in the linear case it is overestimated by
Tx1x2 + x1x2 (1 + τ) dT/dτ
x1x2 + x1 + x2
.
Assuming identical parameter values and dT/dτ , it follows that overestimation under the
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convex case is higher if and only if
T (1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + τ) (1 + q)x1x2dT/dτ
(1 + q)x1x2 + (1 + q)x2 + x1
>
Tx1x2 + x1x2 (1 + τ) dT/dτ
x1x2 + x1 + x2
⇐⇒ T (1 + q) (x1x2)2 + T (1 + q)x21x2 + T (1 + q)x1x22
+
(
(1 + τ) (1 + q) (x1x2)





> T (1 + q) (x1x2)







(1 + τ) (1 + q) (x1x2)
2 + (1 + τ) (1 + q)x1x
2





which therefore is true if and only if






this inequality always holds for T, dT/dτ > 0. Thus, DWL under the convex cost function
case is smaller than under the linear case (note that in reality, optimal endogenous variables,
and therefore, ε differ in the linear and convex cases).
This raises an interesting, related question. Even if the amenity is accounted for, how is
DWL estimation affected by incorrectly assuming a linear rather than convex cost, or vice
versa? Suppose that all parameters and variables that enter the DWL equation are observed,
but the cost of the amenity is incorrectly assumed to be linear. Then, using equations (4.15)












(1 + q) g
− γ (1− τ)
−1 εY
(1 + q) g
+ γ
1 + τ




⇐⇒ −T − (1− τ)−1 εY − (1 + τ) dT
dτ
< 0,
which always holds. Of course, it follows that if all parameters and variables that enter the
DWL equation are observed, but the cost of the amenity is incorrectly assumed to be convex,
then DWL is overestimated.
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4.7.2 Linear Utility





exp (q). Assume ` is inelastic at some level
¯̀,
u = (W + T ) + ¯̀+ q,



























exp(q). Substituting the wage equation into the utility
function, the first-order condition (FOC) with respect to q implies that










− (1 +W )
1 + τ
,
which follows by use of φ′ = φ. As before,
ε =
d log ((1 + τ)W )













Substituting in for dW/dτ implies that
ε =
1− τ
W (1 + τ)
> 0.
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where the second line follows, as before, by rearrangement of the definition of ε, and by use of
the total differential of the first-order condition for q. If utility is assumed to be u = W + T









which, conditional on observing all variables and parameters correctly, overestimated the
true DWL if and only if 1/φ > 0, which always holds.
Linear amenity cost function: φ = q. Assume ` is inelastic at some level ¯̀,
u = (W + T ) + ¯̀+ q,




= W (1 + τ) + q. In (q,W ) space the
slopes of the indifference curves and budget line, are, respectively
dq/dW = −1 and dq = − (1 + τ) .
Hence, an interior solution can only occur if τ = 0. For any τ > 0, W = 0 optimally and
the worker’s entire compensation occurs through amenity provision.





−W (1 + τ) .
Suppose τ = 0 and increases to τ > 0. Then, in (q,W ) space the budget line becomes
107




. Because this point was on the
original budget line, then after implementation of the tax, holding T constant utility does
not change, hence, DWL=0, otherwise DWL= dT/dτ . Clearly, if τ > 0 and increases to





it is again the case that holding T constant DWL= −dT/dτ . Note that in fact, under either
case, as long as T is a fraction of taxable income, then in the former case dT/dτ < 0 and in
the later case dT/dτ = 0. In the former case, this occurs because after the increase in taxes,
taxable income drops to zero. In the later case, taxable income is zero both before and after
the change in taxes. It immediately follows that in the later case the implied value of ε is
infinity (decreasing taxes makes taxable income go from zero to a positive amount), whereas
in the later it is zero (decreasing taxes results in no change in taxable income, which is zero
both before and after the change in taxes).
If the amenity is assumed away, then u is incorrectly assumed to be W + T , and use of








implying that dW/dτ = −W/ (1 + τ). In this case





by definition of ε, meaning that in reality ε = 0 and DWL= W/ (1 + τ). Note that if presence
of the amenity is incorrectly assumed away, as long as relevant variables and parameters are
correctly observed, including the value of ε, whether this be infinity or zero (see discussion
above), then DWL is overestimated; if ε = 0, then the “incorrect” DWL equation form
above implies DWL= W/ (1 + τ). If ε =∞, then the “incorrect” DWL equation form above
implies DWL=∞.
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1. Data are from the NLSY79.
Mean1
7.6% Hispanic, 13.1% black, 79.3% 
non-black,non-Hispanic
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mean tenure 32.8 30.5
variance of tenure 1414 1419
skewness of tenure 2.32 2.29
b as a fraction of flow output 0.370 0.500
unemployment rate 0.040 0.065
job-to-job probability 0.013 0.069
unemployment-to-employment probability 0.230 0.193
wage tenure correlation 0.164 0.225
wage coefficient of variation 0.480 0.489
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0 percent 100.0 100.0
10 percent 99.6 90.0 0.04 1.00
20 percent 98.9 83.6 0.06 0.63
30 percent 97.9 79.3 0.08 0.39
40 percent 96.2 73.2 0.11 0.52
50 percent 92.6 60.7 0.21 1.02
60 percent 87.3 42.6 0.27 1.59
70 percent 78.3 15.5 0.37 3.51
80 percent 63.3 - - -
90 percent 31.2 - - -
1. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at a 0 percent tax rate.
2. Elasticities are with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
















0 percent 100.0 100.0
10 percent 99.6 92.2 0.04 0.77
20 percent 98.9 89.1 0.05 0.29
30 percent 98.1 86.7 0.06 0.20
40 percent 97.0 83.4 0.08 0.26
50 percent 94.5 75.4 0.14 0.55
60 percent 91.9 67.8 0.12 0.47
70 percent 87.8 56.5 0.16 0.63
80 percent 82.2 41.9 0.16 0.74
90 percent 75.9 26.1 0.12 0.68
1. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at a 0 percent tax rate.

















1 month 98.1 98.9
6 months 98.1 98.6
12 months 98.2 98.1
18 months 98.2 97.7
24 months 98.4 97.4
30 months 98.2 97.1
36 months 98.1 96.8
42 months 98.4 96.6
48 months 98.5 96.1






1. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at the 
original 24.8 percent tax rate.
2. The wage tax rate unexpectedly rises 10 percentage points in 
all periods after the initial.
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1.31 0.2 99.55 95.70
2.01 0.3 99.17 94.37
5.11 0.4 98.36 91.26
15.53 0.5 96.79 85.98
30.47 0.6 93.05 77.50
44.47 0.7 88.53 68.86
0 0.8 81.84 56.90
0 0.9 71.86 39.19
DWL calculated from Harberger formula using only Feldstein elasticities


















1. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at a 0 percent tax rate.
2. Amenities are endogenously supplied.
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0.65 0.2 99.55 95.70
1.14 0.3 99.17 94.37
2.84 0.4 98.36 91.26
10.41 0.5 96.79 85.98
14.42 0.6 93.05 77.50
29.24 0.7 88.53 68.86
49.66 0.8 81.84 56.90
72.16 0.9 71.86 39.19
DWL calculated from Harberger formula using only Feldstein elasticities


























#NAME? 12 99.55 95.70
#NAME? 18 99.17 94.37
#NAME? 24 98.36 91.26
#NAME? 30 96.79 85.98
#NAME? 36 93.05 77.50
#NAME? 42 88.53 68.86
48
DWL calculated from Harberger formula using only Feldstein elasticities


















1. Social welfare and taxable income are indexed to 100 at the original 24.8 percent tax rate.
2. The wage tax rate unexpectedly rises 10 percentage points in all periods after the initial.
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